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Peres and President Reagan retired inside the White House for a discussion, lasting more than an hour, on Middle East peace efforts and closer cooperation in combatting terrorism. In his talk with Peres, according to a knowledgeable Israeli source, the President "did not mince his words" when he commented on the P.L.O. and Arafat.
The bulk--seven hours--of Peres' discussions in Washington were with Secretary of State Shultz. But they also included a one-hour meeting between the Israeli leader and CIA Director Casey. At that meeting Peres apparently discussed a number of proposals for permanent joint U.S.-Israeli activities against terrorism. They included the notion of a routine exchange of antiterrorist intelligence information between the two countries. Another, hazier notion was that of future joint U.S.-Israeli antiterrorist operations.
While Peres and Casey swapped ideas, the Justice Department's antiterrorist machinery continued to grind forward. Officials unsealed warrants that charge three Lebanese Shi'ites with the drawn-out Beirut hijacking of TWA jetliner Flight 847 in June and the murder of Navy Diver Robert Stethem. The U.S. offered a $250,000 reward for capture of the trio, all believed to be in Lebanon.
As the chaotic week drew to a close, the Administration began to buckle down to serious conciliation efforts toward the allies that it so wounded in the pursuit of the terrorists. As part of that process, the White House on Friday dispatched Under Secretary of State John Whitehead to Tunis, Rome and Cairo. His primary responsibility, said one Washington official, was to "reaffirm the essential strength of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship." But the State Department made clear that Whitehead, who carried "friendly" letters from President Reagan to Craxi, Mubarak and Tunisian President Habib Bourgiuba, was not going to offer any apologies. As a White House aide put it, "It's the aftermath of something we felt we had to do."
In the long run, Administration officials felt, Washington's tough action had done no permanent damage to the U.S. relationship with either aggrieved ally or to the broader Middle East peace process. What had happened, said one official, was "a temporary dislocation." In the case of Egypt, he argued, "the underlying interests on both sides are just too great."
That assessment was probably correct. Just before noon on Friday, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. Abdel Raouf Reedy appeared at the White House, escorted by Secretary of State Shultz. The envoy was ushered into the Oval Office, where he presented President Reagan with a sealed letter from Mubarak. Reagan took it to read over lunch. In tone and content, Mubarak's letter was remarkably similar to Reagan's message five days earlier: it explained why the Egyptian President felt justified in his previous actions, then agreed that there was all the more reason for the U.S. and Egypt to rebuild their relationship.