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Israel thus found itself in a most uncomfortable position. The prisoners had been taken out of Lebanon by withdrawing Israeli occupation forces. Long before the TWA hijacking, the U.S. contended that transferring them to Atlit violated the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Israeli officials were keenly and resentfully aware that they were likely to be blamed if any foot dragging about release of the Lebanese prisoners prolonged the captivity of the American hostages, and they were concerned about endangering their all- important relationship with the U.S. But they had another imperative to consider: Israel cannot afford to look as if it is yielding to Arab terrorism. U.S. officials were nonetheless saying that Israel would be "no problem."
Although it would run into unexpected delays, the arrangement had been settled on by Friday night. Assad by then had emerged as the intermediary who would take custody of the hostages from Berri and quickly set them free. Berri had agreed to hand over the Americans without any prior or even simultaneous release of the prisoners in Atlit. That would save face for the U.S. and Israel; both countries had insisted that any outright swap would constitute a payoff for terrorism. It was assumed that Israel would begin "unilaterally" setting the Atlit prisoners free as soon as the American hostages were at liberty. Such a release had in fact been planned and promised before the hijacking drama began.
Syria's offer to accept the hostages made it clear that their time in Syria would be short. Word that the arrangement was essentially complete was received by the White House about 7 p.m. Friday. Damascus wasted no time in going public with the news. All American television networks were able to get the report on their 7 p.m. newscasts. The announcements, both in Syria and the U.S., added to the pressure during the tense hours of Saturday to assure that the arrangement did not fall through.
When the hostages finally return to their hometowns for what will be a particularly jubilant Fourth of July week, the celebrations may begin to drown | out the pain that they and their nation have suffered during the 17-day ordeal. But even the more-or-less successful resolution of the hijacking (tending to be forgotten was murdered Navy Diver Robert Stethem) seems unlikely to discourage those who would use hostages as pawns in a political power game and terrorism as a form of propaganda theater. On the contrary, the astonishing adroitness that a militant faction in an anarchic country displayed in monopolizing world attention, in effect holding Washington and much of the American public hostage, is an ominous sign.
Once negotiations were under way, officials from Washington to Jerusalem to Beirut were forced into a symbolic dance under the TV lights. The substance of a solution was not all that problematic. It was obvious from the start that it would have to involve the release of both the hostages and Israel's Lebanese prisoners. All parties seemed willing to accept that. Yet enormous efforts had to be made to avoid any public appearance of a swap.
The final arrangement may be justified as the price a caring nation must pay for the lives of a group of its citizens. For the fact that the hostages are returning home unharmed, the nation can and should feel thankful. But for very little else.