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A. First, we need to discuss with all the parties concerned the implications of change in Central Europe, and also of change in Germany, because the two are related. We cannot end the division of Europe without also, in some fashion, ending the division of Germany. We are past the day when the future of Europe could be shaped either by us or by the Soviets alone, or even by us with the West Europeans. We now need to talk in equal depth with the Russians, with our allies, the West Europeans, and with our friends, the Central Europeans.
Q. Are you using the term "Central Europeans" interchangeably with what we would call "East Europeans"?
A. I'm using it now instead of "East Europeans." East Europe was the geopolitical designation for a reality that is now disappearing.
The military confrontation in the heart of Europe is waning, so there should be significant cuts in our defense budget. Security should be based on some new relationship between the two alliances, rather than a dissolution of the two alliances. Perhaps there could be a long-term arrangement for a transitional NATO and Warsaw Pact presence in the respective parts of a reconfederated Germany, so that there is no insecurity bred.
Suppose we save $20 billion to $30 billion in defense spending on Europe in the next few years. Let's dedicate a third or a fourth of that to a Central European Recovery Fund. If we make a substantial contribution, I think the Europeans will more than match it, and we can bring the Japanese into it.
Q. When Gorbachev persuades the elite to go along with his policies, where is the upside? What have they gained?
A. Only a respite from the strains of the competition as well as an opportunity to address their internal problems and modernize their system. That is what Gorbachev and the people around him are hoping to accomplish.
At the same time, I left the Soviet Union with a sense of deep foreboding. We're getting to a point where Gorbachev and his colleagues will have to make some fundamental choices, all of them very difficult and all of them pregnant with dangers. He will either have to accelerate perestroika, really pushing it forward in the direction of pluralism and the free market, or he will have to engage in severe repression of the non-Russians.
Q. In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs you say that the U.S.S.R. is becoming a "volcano" and a "battleground" of warring nationalities. Will there even be a U.S.S.R. in the year 2001?
A. No. There will have to be something very different. The pace of change, the scale of change, and the drama of the change are all such that we have to stop thinking in conventional terms. Perhaps there will be a Soviet confederation of some sort, much looser than what there is now, with some new form of associated statehood for the Baltic republics. Georgia and some of the other more nationally defined republics could enjoy a much more independent status within the Soviet confederation. If they don't have that, then they will have to have some form of Great Russian nationalist dictatorship. I think Gorbachev is trying to persuade the non-Russian nations that they have to accept some form of yet undefined pluralism as the only alternative.
Q. Does Gorbachev know what he is doing? Does he have a clear plan?