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Eastern Europe also has cause for discomfort. West German leaders like to speak of their nation's historic ties to the region; to many Poles and Czechs and Hungarians, that is as perverse as it is true. A side benefit of the cold war was that it alleviated, at least for a generation or two, the fears that have existed ever since the Teutonic Knights roamed Eastern Europe in the 13th century, taking on the Balts and the Slavs.
The U.S. and its NATO allies can play an important role in encouraging closer ties between the two Germanys while avoiding the instability this could engender. The organization serves both to anchor Bonn to the West and to subsume its potential military might into a cooperative framework. In addition, the continued existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact provides a rationale for preserving two separate German states even as they converge. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's official policy calls for solving "the German Question" within the context of NATO and European economic integration. The Warsaw Pact and NATO also serve the purpose of defusing the nationalist rivalries that Europe has historically harbored.
As the revolutionary changes in the Warsaw Pact continue, NATO's role will inevitably become less military and more political. Far fewer troops will be needed, and significant mutual demobilizations in Europe will be possible if both sides agree. Already NATO's historic mission has changed: the threat of an invasion from the east involves sputtering Trabants rather than Soviet tanks.
The European Community is also a stabilizing influence because it is integrating Bonn's economy with that of its West European partners. "The events in Eastern Europe demand that there be an acceleration in the construction of the E.C.," says Jacques Delors, the former French Finance Minister who now heads the European Commission. The E.C. can help anchor the changes in Eastern Europe by granting economic assistance, trade concessions and eventually some form of associate membership.
The West's most immediate goal should be to encourage East Germany to follow the path of Hungary and Poland toward a freer economy and a more open political process. The outcome of such an evolution need not be reunification. For the time being, the comfort and security of all concerned could be served by having two German states exist side by side, working in harmony the way West Germans now do with Austrians or, for that matter, Canadians with Americans. Eventually, the web of economic and cultural ties could justify a form of confederation in which people and goods could move freely between two states that retain sovereignty. As the concept of national autonomy becomes blurred in a more unified Europe, the question becomes more semantic than real. Secretary of State James Baker has begun speaking of German "reconciliation" rather than reunification.
Ultimately, the future of Germany can be determined only by Germans themselves. Washington and Moscow will have a different opportunity as confrontation turns to cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe. The superpowers will want to negotiate the speed and terms of their withdrawal in a manner that enhances the stability that is in everyone's common interest.