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According to Granma, Ochoa initially tried his hand at money laundering for drug dealers based in Panama, but early last year found a more profitable line of work. Ochoa and an aide forged an alliance with Colonel Antonio de La Guardia, in charge of Cuba's program to circumvent the U.S.'s 29-year economic embargo. Because La Guardia, who was also arrested, was responsible for organizing blockade runners to transport computers and other goods out of the U.S., he had contacts with foreign businessmen and smugglers and had the authority to carry out secret operations. In May 1988 Ochoa's aide traveled to Medellin to meet with Pablo Escobar Gaviria, one of Colombia's most notorious drug barons. Escobar offered Ochoa & Co. $1,200 for every kilo the Cubans helped transport to the U.S. Over the next year, La Guardia arranged 15 successful operations, allowing the drugs to be dropped off either on Cuban land or in Cuban waters and then transferred to speedboats destined for Florida.
But why did Castro approve such a public spectacle? Was his target audience his Latin neighbors, the gringos to the north, or officers within Cuba's military ranks? There seem to be as many theories as there are analysts. Some speculated that the drug purge was designed to improve Castro's tarnished image with his Latin American neighbors, who have little patience for Cuba's Communist bent in an age of fledgling democracies. The move also distanced Cuba from the drug-tainted administration of Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama, with which Cuba has been known to have dealings.
Professor Enrique Baloyra of the University of Miami offered what he calls the "Havana-gate theory," that Castro turned the tables on his drug- trafficking cohorts in an attempt to mask his own involvement. By this account, Ochoa fell on his own sword to save the Jefe. Certainly Ochoa went out of his way during his half-hour confession to absolve Castro of any complicity. Those analysts who suspected that high-level Cuban officials were less innocent of the drug scheme than they let on pointed to one small irony: the tribunal included Admiral Aldo Santamaria Cuadrado, who in 1982 was one of four Cuban officials indicted in Miami for conspiring with a notorious Colombian drug smuggler. Because there is no extradition treaty between the U.S. and Cuba, the four men never stood trial.
Some State Department officials suggested that Castro seized the drug issue as a way to begin a rapprochement with Washington. Their projection was based on recent conciliatory remarks from Cuba hinting at a desire for better ties, and past overtures by Castro to cooperate on hijackings and immigration. Others at State were inclined to accept the explanation offered by Granma, that the Cuban government opened an investigation last April after rumors from friends and complaints from the U.S. suggested that the authorized operation to break the American embargo was being used to transport drugs. Many analysts think that Castro was genuinely outraged to learn of the drug running; the Cuban leader is known to be a moralist who hates drugs and corruption.