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It is Jan. 27, and Baker is sitting in the seventh-floor Secretary's office at the State Department watching Bush conduct his first press conference as President. "Pull up your tie, George," says Baker affectionately to the TV screen. "And be careful with the F.M.L.N. question." But no one asks about the peace proposal offered by the leftist guerrilla group in El Salvador that calls itself the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, so Baker responds to an imagined query. He has changed course.
When the guerrillas' plan to participate in national elections first surfaced, the "Building," as the Foreign Service calls its Washington headquarters, rejected the scheme out of hand. "Wrong thing to do," said Baker, who immediately ordered a more welcoming response. Telegraphing a willingness to consider the F.M.L.N.'s proposal had a twofold purpose: first, to let U.S. Latin allies know that the Bush Administration is taking a fresh look at Central America. Second, to signal to congressional opponents of the Reagan policy that Bush will consider any new option, no matter the origin. "Getting the edge, in Central America especially," says Baker, "requires a bipartisan approach, and that requires our maintaining the moral high ground. Nothing is going to get accomplished down south without Congress being on board."
By this standard, "Baker is already a sure winner," says Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd, a persistent critic of Reagan's Central America policy. "I was very impressed. That kind of quick work shows that Baker's sweet bipartisan talk during his confirmation hearings was more than rhetoric."
Despite Baker's irritation with State's initial position -- and in marked contrast to the flailing that has characterized the Administration's various proposals for bailing out the nation's savings and loans -- nothing about the change in Salvador policy was undertaken hysterically. To a person, those who have worked with Baker say he mistrusts solutions offered at the top of one's voice, and has no faith in those who offer them. He listens respectfully to all comers, as if each speaker is the age of reason's local representative.
Baker "runs a calm shop," says State Department counselor Robert Zoellick. "There's no nonsense. You state your views and support them, both as briefly and quietly as possible. Then you get out." Zoellick, who could have been White House domestic-affairs adviser, is one of a handful of Baker aides who turned down more visible posts elsewhere in the Administration. "The reason for that," says Margaret Tutwiler, who has been Baker's closest assistant for more than ten years, "is that ((Baker)) is loyal down as well as up. He seeks out strong-minded people and delegates considerable authority. In the end, he decides without agonizing and moves on. He doesn't postpone."
Unless postponement is tactically useful. Since the U.S. began discussions with the P.L.O. last December, Israel has heard little from the Administration's highest reaches. The result has been frantic maneuvering in Jerusalem, movement that may make the next step toward negotiations easier. Rather than react to an American agenda, Yitzhak Shamir's government is being forced to craft its own. "Sometimes," says Baker, "a pro-active policy is best advanced by doing nothing until the right time."