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Last fall, for the first time in two decades, the Soviets stopped publishing monthly economic statistics. Soviet economic planners not long ago discussed making the ruble a convertible currency. That would undoubtedly involve a massive devaluation of the Soviet currency, which is worth $1.60 at the official rate and about 20 cents on the black market. More recently authorities have said it will be at least 15 years before such a move occurs. Some Western analysts have suggested that Moscow should spend some of its estimated $80 billion in gold reserves on consumer products from the West. But Soviet officials have long held that any dependence on the West would be a dangerous precedent.
Partly to mollify frustrated Soviet shoppers, authorities last week announced new restrictions on the export of Soviet appliances by visitors from abroad. As a practical matter, the rules will affect mainly East Europeans paying for their travel with other soft currencies who sometimes find in the Soviet Union products that are scarce at home. Western visitors and residents will continue to have access to a wider selection of consumer goods than most Soviets enjoy at stores called beriozkas that deal only in much desired hard currencies.
The Communist Party newspaper Pravda pinpointed yet another reason for the empty store shelves. In a story accompanied by photos showing tons of consumer goods -- from TV sets to champagne to vegetables -- piled uselessly in railroad stations around Moscow, Pravda left the impression that the backup was caused by sabotage, presumably by freight handlers or other workers. Soviet officials issued a denial but in the process inadvertently indicted the whole system of transporting goods. The stockpiles, they said, were the result not of deliberate disruption but of poor management and lack of delivery trucks. "I know this problem well," said Luzhkov, growing red in the face when asked about the Pravda story. "There isn't the slightest smell of sabotage. It's the usual disorganization."
Most Kremlin watchers in the U.S. believe that Gorbachev is still backed by the Soviet military and security establishments, whose officials realize that perestroika is vital to maintaining their own long-term primacy. But Gorbachev cannot expect to hold on indefinitely without delivering some tangible results from the policy on which he so boldly staked his political future.