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Most of all, the unexpected and unquenchable uprising in the occupied territories emboldened Arafat to take a chance. He risked losing control of the Palestinian cause altogether unless he could win the "children of the stones" some tangible gain for a year of pain. At the same time, the intifadeh blessed the Palestinians, and by extension even the P.L.O., with a legitimacy Arafat had never been able to earn. Perhaps the past 13 years of diplomatic isolation by the U.S. was simply the necessary learning period for the movement.
Arafat's public commitment to cease terrorism was straightforward: "I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism." Arafat also made a significant concession of substance in his Geneva speech to the U.N. He rejected absolutism in favor of "realistic and attainable formulas that settle the ((Arab-Israeli)) issue on the basis of the possible." That is new and welcome from the P.L.O. Specifically, Arafat said the Palestinians would settle for two states in the Holy Land, one Palestinian and one Israeli, borders undefined. Those who do not trust him will recall the words of the 1968 Palestinian National Charter, which calls for the complete destruction of Israel. The P.L.O. has not renounced that covenant, but many Western diplomats were prepared to accept last week's words as the operative policy.
The P.L.O. has made life more difficult for Israeli diplomats by publicly committing itself to a negotiated settlement. For years Israel was able to argue that it had no need to go to the bargaining table because no partner sat there. Now the Palestinians' designated spokesman, however unlovely, may be there.
The U.S. had little to lose in testing the P.L.O.'s sincerity. The Jordanian option, the long-favored attempt by the U.S. and Peres to make King Hussein the surrogate peacemaker for the Palestinians, withered away last July when the King gave up all responsibility for the occupied West Bank. Washington's stubborn holdout in the face of Arafat's peace offensive had bound Uncle Sam in the unaccustomed straitjacket of the spoiler. Shultz's announcement not only ended months of intense criticism from West European and Arab friends but also restored U.S. credibility and influence as an honest broker in the Middle East conflict.
Even American Jews were surprisingly mild in their response to a move many of them deeply mistrust. Most of them trust George Shultz as the best friend Israel ever had, and that seemed to help them see beyond natural fear to the glimmer of hope these events refract. In a rare divergence from the Israeli government line, the major umbrella organization of American Jews said it would not fight the Administration's decision. "Knowing this man," said Morris Abram, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, "I believe he would like to produce peace in the area without impairing the security of Israel one bit." But many U.S. Jews doubt the dialogue will work as planned. They believe, Abram warned, it will reveal once and for all that "the obstacle to peace is not Israel but Arab intransigence."