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Swedish diplomats have a tradition of mediating between Arabs and Jews that goes back to Count Folke Bernadotte and U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring. Last September was the 40th anniversary of Bernadotte's assassination in Jerusalem, and many Swedes were enraged when two former members of the ultra-Zionist Stern Gang went on Israeli television and boasted about their part in the killing. The incident may have helped intensify Swedish efforts to get the U.S. and the P.L.O. talking.
Seeking a buffer, Andersson had his aides invite three prominent American Jews to Stockholm. New York attorney Rita Hauser, Los Angeles publisher Stanley Sheinbaum, and Drora Kass of the Center for Peace in the Middle East met with Arafat aides on Nov. 21. Out of this came a covert P.L.O. statement, which the visiting Americans and the Swedes considered a decisive advance beyond what the P.L.O. had said in Algiers. The new language was shown to Shultz by the Swedish diplomats on Nov. 25.
If he was impressed, the Secretary did not show it. His concern about terrorism was so great that on the very next day he seized the issue to reject Arafat's visa request to appear before the U.N. General Assembly. Arafat was "an accessory" to terrorism, Shultz held, and his presence in New York City would pose an unacceptable security problem. The worldwide criticism of the lonely U.S. stand was deafening.
Although unable to say so publicly, Bush and his incoming Secretary of State James Baker were troubled by Shultz's actions. "They were annoyed that his actions were going to make it extremely difficult to get anywhere in the Middle East," said an Administration official. "Their sense was that he was creating a mess that he could walk away from in a few weeks." Both men felt that the visa rejection, while based on principle, gave Arafat the image of an underdog being bullied by the U.S. Bush publicly backed Shultz but quietly urged that he press the Palestinians to meet the U.S. conditions.
As the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to hear Arafat in Geneva instead of New York, Andersson decided to invite the Americans back to Stockholm. In a critical meeting on Dec. 7, exactly a week before Arafat's speech, five American Jews met with Arafat.
The Swedish government had asked the U.S. for suggestions on the language for Arafat to use that would be acceptable to Shultz. The State Department drafted wording, clearly stating the P.L.O.'s acceptance of Israel and renunciation of terrorism. In addition, Shultz sent word through the Swedes that if Arafat accepted the key phrasing, the U.S. would push for immediate talks.
Although a public summary of the discussions fell short of Washington's stiff requirements, Arafat privately agreed to the State Department's proposed language. It was clear that the P.L.O. leader wanted to save his big move for his Geneva U.N. speech, magnified in importance by the Shultz visa rejection.