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One sign of the government's bad faith was that it waited until after the crackdown to carry out its first significant economic "reform": price hikes of up to 400% on food and other necessities. Solidarity had previously agreed that subsidized food prices would have to rise, but the government had refused to grant what the union was asking in exchange: the right to monitor economic data. Says Andrzej Wolowski, who formerly directed Solidarity's international relations and now lives in Paris: "Things would not have got so tense politically if the government had accepted our practical suggestions. But they took them as a threat."
Could Solidarity have survived by being more moderate, consolidating its initial gains and accepting half a loaf? Probably not. There was no way a Marxist-Leninist regime could have tolerated an independent entity whose very existence challenged the party's monopoly of power. Accepting even a moderate Solidarity meant ceasing to be a Communist state. At the same time, Solidarity's creation unleashed aspirations in Polish society that were beyond anyone's control. Conflict was unavoidable.
The party's increasing disarray prevented it from either smashing Solidarity or reaching an understanding with the union. Finally the regime's only stable and disciplined institution—the military—had to step in and do what the party itself could not. As one West European diplomat in Warsaw puts it, "Solidarity had become the country, and the country had said, 'Enough!' There was no way to dominate it except through martial law."
"The only way to save the union," says Solidarity's Gmaj, "would have been to allow it to fall under Communist Party control, but that would have destroyed the essence of Solidarity." In the end, Solidarity remained true to its democratic values. And so, in the name of very different values, the regime had to strangle it.
—By Thomas A. Sancton. Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof/Warsaw and Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington with other bureaus