(2 of 3)
We have a growing Syrian alignment with Iran, a threat to Iraq, a threat to the Persian Gulf states, to Saudi Arabia, to the collective interests of the moderate Arab world. The moderate Arab world shares a strategic consensus—that's what I was talking about last year when you fellows were so skeptical. Of course the consensus is constantly butting up against the Arab-Israeli dispute, but it's a new factor of increasing significance, which one hopes can be used to ameliorate historic problems.
Everybody loved to say, "Haig is trying to create a strategic consensus." I'm not trying to create a strategic consensus. I was trying to recognize one that was emerging, and to point out that it had an impact, and will from this day forward, on events in the Middle East. It can be derailed by Arab-Israeli tensions at any moment. But it isn't going to change. It's there. If it becomes Sovietized, through the new Syrian connection with Iran, for example, then we have a most serious problem.
Q. Several recent visitors to Cuba have come back with the idea that President Fidel Castro is ready for an overture and have criticized the Administration for not responding.
A. Look, Mr. Castro knows very, very clearly those aspects of his policy that have alienated him from the U.S. and a large portion of the rest of the Western Hemisphere—intervention in the internal affairs of other states in this hemisphere and elsewhere. This is not to prejudge whether or not he might be willing to reconsider, but years of experience and a fruitless dialogue in the preceding Administration would make one very wary of being drawn into meaningless discussions for discussion's sake.
Q. On Soviet-American relations, there is a sense that American policy has recently been reactive to Moscow initiatives. Only three months after your talk with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, when you declared that Poland cast a long and dark shadow over East-West relations, there is talk about a summit with President Leonid Brezhnev and a rush to engage in arms-control talks.
A. It's very clear that President Reagan considers the subject of arms control in a special category of normal bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union. For example, the President proceeded with the talks on reducing nuclear arms in Europe despite the Polish situation, because of his very special concern about the growth of nuclear armaments and his dedication to the negotiation of substantial reductions. This, however, does not mean that the prospects for arms control are not influenced by linkage.
On the talk of summitry, the President said if Brezhnev were to attend a special disarmament conference, he would be pleased to meet with him. He described that as something different from summitry. That does not represent being driven in any way by Soviet policies. Perhaps even just the opposite, if you think hard about it.
Q. Still, it seems that the Soviets need an arms agreement perhaps more than the U.S. does, given their terrible economy.