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During the Carter Administration, there was high-level interest in organizing pro-Somoza exiles in Florida and elsewhere into a counterforce that would "keep the Sandinistas off guard and on the defensive," as one of TIME'S sources puts it. That idea was abandoned fairly early during the Reagan presidency, after CIA station chiefs weighed in with persuasive arguments that it would be against U.S. interests in Central America to appear to be associated with a Somoza restoration movement. With Administration approval, the agency has apparently concentrated on recruiting disgruntled Sandinistas and other anti-Somoza Nicaraguans for the paramilitary group. But recruitment has proceeded slowly, in part because exile communities in Florida have been heavily infiltrated by Cuban agents. According to one source, the principal goal of the paramilitary group is to unsettle Nicaragua by such subversive acts as blowing up bridges and power plants. Another source said that the purpose of the group was slightly more benign: the CIA simply wanted to have "assets" in place if the Sandinista government collapsed on its own because of domestic unrest caused by food shortages and the deterioration of public services.
Stories that the U.S. is financing covert operations in Nicaragua play directly into the hands of the Sandinistas. They contribute to the widespread impression that the U.S. is as ham-fisted as ever in its approach to Central America, discourage Washington's remaining friends in the area and seem to justify the Sandinistas in seeking Cuban (if not Soviet) protection. Thus, the publicity may require the Government to review the feasibility of the operation, even though it could be validly considered a proper adjunct to U.S. diplomatic goals. Complained one high Administration official: "The leak was devastating." Indeed, the consequence of a pattern of such leaks would be to cripple U.S. intelligence action anywhere in the world.
The evidence of Nicaragua's military buildup was only the first step in what was supposed to be a justification of the Administration's policies in Central America. The second—and crucial—step was to establish a firm link between that buildup and Sandinista support for, and even direction of, the rebel effort in El Salvador. But Haig decided to avoid any discussion of El Salvador in the State Department's briefing because there were not enough declassified data available to make a compelling case for the link. The Administration insists that its evidence of outside arms shipments to the El Salvador rebels is based partly on information gathered by undercover agents, and cannot be discussed without compromising confidential sources.