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In turn, many of Walesa's critics felt that he had been too moderate toward an intransigent regime. "He has an enormous tendency to give in, to agree with the government," complained Economist Stefan Kurowski, the principal author of Solidarity's economic program. "He is not intelligent enough. He is prone to listen to advisers who want to make careers." Andrzej Gwiazda, a radical who challenged Walesa for the leadership post, contemptuously called him a "dictatorial, vain fool" and a "blockhead with a mustache."
Walesa's populist style and personality, as appealing as they were to the public, irked many of his fellow union leaders. Mieczyslaw Lach, a regional union leader, charged that "Walesa takes too many decisions himself. We often need quick, clear decision, but he has gone too far."
Walesa tried to show that he understood the forces that drove his Solidarity critics, both at the local and national levels. Said he: "You have to remember that in the factories people are not normally interested in politics. They are just normal, gray people, and they say, 'Look, it was pretty bad before August [1980], but at least we had our bread, we had some sort of living conditions, and life was possible then. Now, after you [Solidarity] took over, it is worse.' So activists at the local level are under pressure. Some people want solutions fast. This is the only thing we differ in. I want to be more careful: I don't want to see the renewal collapse. But those guys want to make a blitzkrieg."
In the end, of course, a different blitzkrieg came, launched by the distant, enigmatic figure who was trained to attack. On Feb. 9 General Jaruzelski had been made Premier by the government and had begun to spar with Walesa's union. But on Oct. 18 the Communist Party's Central Committee accepted the resignation of the ineffectual Kania and elevated General Jaruzelski to the party leadership, the real source of power in the country. Jaruzelski was thus the head of the party, the government and the army. The very fact that the Soviets allowed the Poles to violate the Communist dogma that party civilians must always control the military was a sign of their dismay over the Polish party's disarray, and of their faith in the Soviet-schooled general.
Jaruzelski was a man whom Moscow could trust. He had been trained by the Soviets and fought in the Red Army during World War II. In contrast to the corrupt leaders of the Gierek regime, he had a clean personal record and a spartan lifestyle. Although he had spent ten years on the Polish Politburo, he stayed aloof from the political and ideological infighting within the party. As Defense Minister, moreover, he controlled the regime's only disciplined and organized institution: Poland's 210,000-man army, which still had the respect of the people.
In contrast to Walesa, the balding, stern-faced general projected no charisma. His image of cold detachment was heightened by the dark glasses he normally wore because of a chronic eye inflammation. But the