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As it happens, the old argument about how much Washington knew of the Japanese attack plans in advance is opening up again. British Author John Costello, in his just published The Pacific War (Rawson, Wade; $24), contends that the U.S. and Britain had agreed in November to join forces in case of a Japanese attack—although the offensive was expected in the Philippines or Malaya. In Infamy, to be published by Doubleday next March, Historian John Toland argues that Washington for decades covered up its failure to warn Pearl Harbor of the imminent danger.
However these arguments may sort out in light of the new discoveries, the most serious error was committed by the Japanese. Prange points out that Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, commander of the Pearl Harbor strike force, had many misgivings about the attack and ultimately failed to exploit its success after carrying out his original orders. When the initial two waves of planes returned to their carriers, Nagumo ordered the task force home. Because the U.S. carriers Lexington and Enterprise were still somewhere at sea, the admiral was concerned about protecting his fleet. Had he sent in another wave of attackers, however, he could easily have destroyed a huge supply of fuel in aboveground tanks. Deprived of that fuel, what was left of the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have had to pull back to West Coast ports, leaving the Pacific to the Japanese.
As it was, Pearl Harbor was soon resurrected and the fleet rebuilt. Japan's shaky chance to keep the U.S. out of the war in the Pacific was irretrievably lost and Americans' will to win unquenchably ignited.
—By Mayo Mohs