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The Carter Administration's initial response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan last December was largely rhetorical. In his State of the Union message in January, the President warned that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S., and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."
Critics charge—and White House officials privately concede—that the U.S. is ill prepared to back up Carter's tough talk. Declared former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger last week: "The military forces presently and prospectively in place in the region are not sufficient by themselves adequately to constrain Soviet moves if the Soviet Union were to become more aggressive."
But the Administration has begun to redress the Soviet-American military balance in the region. The U.S. has negotiated agreements with Somalia, Kenya and Oman for access to their ports and airfields in a crisis. Borrowing vessels from its Mediterranean and Pacific fleets, the U.S. Navy has stationed two nuclear-armed aircraft carrier groups in the Indian Ocean and a five-vessel task force in the area of the gulf itself. In March the Pentagon announced the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, a reservoir of more than 200,000 troops from which the President could draw an instant expeditionary force.
Says the commander of the RDJTF, Marine Lieut. General Paul X. Kelley: "We have a global mission, but our focus is on the Persian Gulf." Since some of the units available to Kelley are not sufficiently trained and equipped for combat and most are based in the U.S., the force would have to be quickly whipped into shape and airlifted to staging areas mear the combat zone. There it would "marry up" with equipment and supplies prepositioned on ships now cruising off Diego Garcia, a British-owned island in the Indian Ocean some 2,500 miles south of Hormuz. The U.S. has leased base rights on the island.
Making good on Carter's vow in the event of a showdown in the gulf could be a logistical nightmare. Administration strategists are concentrating on dealing with four possible emergencies. Three are based on the Afghanistan experience—"invitations" to Moscow by secessionist Azerbaijanis in northwestern Iran, or by Baluchis in southeastern Iran, or by an embattled leftist government in Tehran that eventually might take over from the mullahs. The fourth possibility is a Soviet thrust into Pakistan, under the pretext of hot pursuit of Afghan rebels. In each case, the U.S. would have to contend with an overwhelming Soviet advantage: geographical proximity. "When you talk about projecting combat power 7,000 miles and then sustaining it over the long haul," says Kelley, "it boggles the mind. That's why it's absolutely essential that we have access to facilities in the region."
Critics, including Ronald Reagan, believe that the U.S. will need more, including a land-based military presence in or near the gulf area. Explains Reagan's chief foreign policy adviser, Richard Allen: "The key problem with the Carter Administration's approach is the absence of American personnel on the ground."