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The structure that I am proposing would enable Europeans to confront—on their own initiative and in their own context—issues that have been evaded for at least two decades: the precise definition of an adequate conventional defense; the nature of the so-called nuclear threshold—the point where there is no choice except conventional defeat or nuclear escalation; the relationship between strategy and arms control. Since nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional defense failed, Europe would be responsible for setting the nuclear threshold by its own efforts; it could relieve its nuclear anxieties by the simple expedient of augmenting its conventional defenses.
By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR and INF negotiations would place final responsibility for both conventional force levels and intermediate-range missile deployment in Europe with the leaders whose countries will have to bear the brunt—for good or ill—of the outcome of these negotiations. This is especially important with respect to the American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. That deployment makes sense only if the allies genuinely believe that the prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe on Soviet territory will help deter a Soviet conventional attack or nuclear blackmail. If our principal allies do not share this conviction, the psychological basis for the deployment will evaporate.
European chairmanship of the INF talks would oblige Europe's leaders to face the issue headon; their domestic critics would no longer be able to argue (as they do now) that U.S. intransigence is the principal obstacle to arms control.
As for the U.S., it would of course participate in these deliberations—in a less dominant position—through its continued membership in the integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear defense, and its ground, naval and air forces in Europe.
REDEPLOYMENT
The issue of redeploying American forces touches raw European nerves like no other. The slightest hint of altering present arrangements jangles sensibilities; it evokes fears of American withdrawal and prospects of European neutralism. But if present trends continue, it is certain to become a central issue in the alliance relationship. Before dealing with it in the context of a program of NATO reform, a few facts must be noted:
1) The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s, when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation—to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. Massive retaliation paradoxically required that the total forces on the Continent be kept below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to nonnuclear means. Hence the American conventional deployment in Europe reflected political, not military, criteria: it was intended to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave the Soviets no doubt that this would