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As it happened, Sharon had special reason to be sensitive to criticism. According to reports from Jerusalem, the Begin government failed to consult or inform either the Israeli Cabinet or the ministerial defense committee of the plan for the Wednesday assault on West Beirut. At a Thursday-night Cabinet meeting, some ministers asked who had approved the operation and when this had been done. Prime Minister Begin, regarding the inquiries as a personal attack, angrily attempted to justify the military action. He also admitted that the decision had been made by Sharon and himself at a private meeting. Said Begin: "Even David Ben-Gurion had to make decisions of the same nature on his own." The explanation caused speculation among some Israelis that Begin and Sharon, fearing a defeat of the assault plan at the Cabinet level, had simply decided to proceed on their own. It also strengthened the view that Sharon enjoys too much power within the Begin government. Remarked a senior U.S. diplomat: "We are beginning to wonder if the political leadership in Jerusalem is being manipulated by the military." Said an Israeli Labor Party leader of the ambitious Sharon: "He has discovered completely the potentials of power, but he has not yet discovered its limitations."
Ironically, the attacks on West Beirut came just as Habib thought that his peacemaking mission was on the brink of success. Early last week a Habib aide placed what State Department officials termed a "euphoric" call to Washington. Habib, who had been repeatedly in touch with the P.L.O. through his Lebanese intermediaries, sent home a cable that was a bit more cautious, indicating considerable optimism but noting that there were still t's to be crossed and i's to be dotted." Even so, declared one top State Department official, "we had 95% and only needed a couple of more days to get 100%."
But the Israelis belittled Habib's overtures. To members of Begin's Cabinet, the envoy's letter was couched in precisely the same vague diplomatese that has come to infuriate the Israelis in their dealings with the American. Habib's letter was peppered with such phrases as "I have reason to believe" and "We can assume," according to an Israeli official familiar with its contents. Begin even quoted some of the phrases in his letter to President Reagan to show his skepticism about the Habib mission. With all its hedges, Habib's proposal seemingly reinforced the growing Israeli conviction that diplomacy was becoming useless in coping with the P.L.O.
Jerusalem was also hostile to U.N. efforts. Israeli troops simply turned back a convoy of U.N. observers who had arrived at the outskirts of Beirut in an effort to carry out a Security Council resolution instructing them to take up positions in the Lebanese capital.