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Meanwhile, Iraqi reaction to the raid has continued to be remarkably restrained. The country's basic strategy so far seems to be to let Israel condemn itself with its own words. Iraq has already earned a wide measure of world sympathy. A violent, desperate act cannot yet be ruled out, but Iraq does not seem interested in wasting valuable support.
In its timing, at least, Israel may have been right about the raid. So thinks a senior Western diplomat in Beirut, who feels that the Israelis suspect, correctly, that as the Reagan Administration clarifies its Middle East policy, "it will almost certainly move more in favor of the Arabs. So, if a strike against Iraq were necessary, there would never be a better time." The same diplomat doubts that Israel will soon strike the Syrian missiles in Lebanon. Says he: "Any attempt to remove the missiles will involve Israeli casualties, and the last thing the Israeli Prime Minister needs as the country moves toward a general election is Israeli dead and wounded."
In the aftermath of the raid, American as well as Israeli officials have suggested that not all Arabs were outraged, or even unhappy, about the demolition of Iraq's atomic reactor, despite the Arabs' apparently solid front. Prior to the raid both Syria and Saudi Arabia were in ensely suspicious of the Saddam Hussein regime. If either country—not to mention the warring Iranians—took Hussein's atomic ambitions as seriously as the Israelis did, they would be relieved by the attack. So too the Egyptians. Insists an Israeli Foreign Ministry official: "We have discreet information that the Saudis are happy, and some Egyptian officials have expressed quiet satisfaction."
In the corridors of French power, there was also a sense of relief that the Iraqi reactor was gone, although diplomats were sharply opposed to the Israeli tactics Foreign Minister Cheysson had already declared that "we Socialists would never have signed this [nuclear] contract. At least not without a clearer idea of Iraqi intentions. And not without clearer guarantees that it could be used only for peaceful purposes." Paris would likely demand much tougher restrictions for the reactor if asked to rebuild it.
But a number of deeply disturbing issues remain. The first is the increasingly truculent unpredictability of Israel, at least under Menachem Begin. The Reagan Administration—and Congress —needs to pursue the unpleasant implications of the fact that no hold on Israeli behavior seems to be strong enough. The same examination is needed within Israel which runs the risk of ever increasing isolation if even relatively new friends, like Egypt's Sadat, must brace for a shocking surprise just three days after a public show of Israeli esteem.
It is equally obvious that nothing short of a comprehensive Middle East agreement, including a just settlement for the issue of Palestinian self-determination, will bring true peace to the region. After the Tammuz raid, no Arab country can accept Secretary of State Haig's thesis that Soviet adventurism is a greater threat to the area. No less a figure than Saudi Arabia's King Khalid made the point last week during a visit to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Without movement toward that regional goal, even the most conservative Arab states may give up