In a mobilized society, the military's influence is pervasive
Unlike Leonid Brezhnev, who loved to wear row upon row of medals, Yuri Andropov kept his army general's uniform in the closet. But if the late Soviet leader gave every appearance of being a civilian, his ties to the military Establishment came under increasing scrutiny during his brief tenure. Andropov, it was believed, owed a debt to the military because Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov had backed him in the race to succeed Brezhnev. In what many saw as a disquieting sign of the brass hats' growing power, it was the military's Chief of Staff, Nikolai Ogarkov, who stepped forward to explain the Soviet decision to shoot down Korean Air Line Flight 007 last September. Now, as the Soviets go through another transition, a critical question remains unanswered. Does the military play an increasingly influential role within the closed world of the Kremlin?
Beyond the medieval crenelated walls of the Moscow citadel, Soviet society certainly seems to the outsider to be in a permanent state of mobilization. In the streets of the Soviet capital, civilians stand patiently in long, dreary lines outside shops, as if wartime rationing were still in force, while above them huge 1930s-style posters show jut-jawed young men and women shouting slogans. Columns of army trucks filled with uniformed soldiers can sometimes be seen rumbling through city centers. There is even a military presence at soccer matches, when soldiers encircle the playing field to keep rowdy fans in order. Every town of any importance has a monument to the 20 million Soviets who died in World War II. Often the memorials are guarded by rosy-cheeked youths who carry automatic rifles (unloaded) and wear the red neckerchief of the Pioneers, the Soviet equivalent of scouts. On their wedding day, young brides and grooms go to war memorials to lay floral tributes to fallen soldiers. On park benches, old men playing chess wear rows of ribbons that attest to their military service.
The Reagan Administration has based its defense and arms-control policies on the premise that for the first time the Soviet Union has moved significantly ahead in most important measures of military power. The U.S.S.R. has outstripped the U.S. in weapons production over the past decade. According to a Pentagon report issued last year, the Soviets have built 2,000 ICBMs, compared with 350 for the U.S.; 6,000 new combat aircraft, vs. 3,000 for the U.S.; 85 new surface warships, compared with 72 for the U.S.; and 61 attack submarines, against 27 for the U.S. When it comes to tanks and armored vehicles, the U.S.S.R. has outproduced the U.S. by 54,000 to 11,000. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser in the Carter Administration, Moscow's arms buildup at the expense of development in other areas has turned the Soviet Union into a "onedimensional" world power.