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Still, Brezhnev's protégé could find a place in a troika of the old guard that might include such other also-rans as Premier Nikolai Tikhonov, 78, or powerful Moscow Party Boss Viktor Grishin, 69. Grishin remains a favorite compromise candidate. He has an insider's view of the party bureaucracy and saw something of the world when he traveled abroad as leader of the official trade unions movement. A younger member of the old elite, Grishin is not likely to rock the boat and could lead a caretaker government, but he lacks a position on the party Secretariat.
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, 74, moved up one rung in the hierarchy last March when he was unexpectedly promoted to the post of First Deputy Premier. It was a clear indication that Gromyko had emerged, along with Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, as a key power-broker in the post-Brezhnev era. But after more than 26 years as Foreign Minister, during which he has worked with nine U.S. Secretaries of State, the "Grim Grom," as he is known in Western diplomatic circles, has not built a political power base at home. Gromyko has never appeared overly ambitious to hold his nation's highest office. A dark horse, he is more likely to stay in the stable or to find himself, like Chernenko, hitched to a troika.
As a representative of the one sector in Soviet life that appears to work, Ustinov, 75, may have the best qualifications for the party's top job. During Andropov's decline, Ustinov had already moved to the forefront to enunciate official policy on arms control and Soviet missile deployment in Eastern Europe. A mechanical engineer who spent most of his career building up the defense industry, Ustinov is keenly aware of the chronic bottlenecks in Soviet production that have accounted for sluggish economic growth. Should the ruling elite feel nervous about turning the Soviet Union's pressing agenda of problems over to an unseasoned "youth," Ustinov might prove an ideal choice as a regent in a transitional regime.
But if the steady rise of the Soviet military Establishment over the past decade has enhanced Ustinov's power, it may ultimately keep him from becoming party leader. Ustinov does not currently have a foothold in the Secretariat. Indeed, the aging defense planner may be too closely linked to the military for the comfort of many party bureaucrats. Says Daniel Papp of the Georgia Institute of Technology: "Some people will oppose Ustinov for precisely the same reason that others will support him, because of his strong identification with the military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union."
Even if the leadership did want to give power to a younger man rather than risk elevating another aging leader whose tenure could rapidly turn into a death watch, the choice was very limited. Brezhnev all but closed the upper ranks of the party to youthful aspirants. Only two younger contenders are now vying for the top party post: