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But even as the students rejoiced, the fighting in Grenada continued. The initial invasion force of 1,900 had grown to 6,000 men. They controlled the island's major populated areas, but not its wooded and mountainous ulterior. Although the Administration had at first expected the U.S. troops to be able to withdraw within a few weeks at most, leaving police from the neighboring islands to maintain order, the military field commanders were becoming less sanguine. "If the Cubans want to go up hi these hills and play games, it will take a while," said Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, commander of the invading American task force. "This is a jungle."
Grenada's General Austin, whose cold-blooded executions had created the chaos that prompted the invasion, had still not been located by week's end; he was believed to have fled into the mountains with his hard-core followers. But on Saturday a Marine detachment found the long-missing Coard in a guarded house in St. George's. Said he of the Bishop murder before he was whisked off to the Guam: "I'm not responsible. I'm not responsible."
Clearly, it would not be easy to find a group of Grenadian leaders who could form a government that would restore stability to the island. One possibility, being contemplated by Britain, Canada and other former British colonies, was the creation of a Commonwealth force to replace the U.S. troops once the fighting had ended.
Still, having employed force in such a dramatic and massive way, the U.S. had probably assumed the practical burden of helping shape Grenada's future. Observed a Grenadian lawyer familiar with his nation's tangled politics: "The U.S. can't just invade a nation and then leave. If we are to be healed now in a democratic way, the U.S. must stay." The lesson was all too familiar: it is easier to intervene in a country's affairs than to walk away from its problems.
—By Ed Magnuson. Reported by Douglas Brew/Washington, Bernard Diederich/ St. George's and William McWhirter /Bridgetown