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In addition, our failure to act on the treaty was forcing some of our best friends and allies among the other American nations to take sides between us and Panama, and they were not supporting us. This issue had become a litmus test, indicating how the U.S., as a superpower, would treat a small and relatively defenseless nation that had always been a close partner and supporter.
On March 13, 1977, meeting with the Panamanians in Washington, our negotiators proposed two treaties. One would set forth new arrangements for the joint operation of the Canal for the rest of this century, at the end of which Panama would assume total control. The other would guarantee the permanent neutrality of the Canal, and the right of the U.S. to defend it.
I decided to invite national leaders throughout this hemisphere to attend a signing ceremony on Sept. 7. As Torrijos and I waited in a small office before entering the large assembly hall, he tried to thank me for ending generations of frustration and despair among the Panamanian people. But before he could finish his statement, he broke down and sobbed as his wife held him.
On Aug. 9,1 recorded in my diary: "We sent all the Senators a telegram urging them not to speak out against the treaty until they know the details of the agreement. Apparently it worked with most of them except for a few nuts like Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms."
The Senate had been debating the first treaty for 22 days, and everyone, friend or foe, was ready for the verdict. I listened to the final vote on March 16, 1978, in my little private office, checking off each Senator against the tally sheet where I had listed his or her commitment. I had never been more tense in my life as we listened to each vote shouted out on the radio. My assistants and I had not missed one in our count; there were no surprises. I thanked God when we got the 67th and deciding vote. [The final vote was 68 to 32; a two-thirds majority is needed to pass a treaty.] It will always be one of my proudest moments, and one of the great achievements in the history of the U.S. Senate. The vote on the second treaty, 33 days later, came out exactly the same as on the first treaty. later, came out exactly the same as on the first treaty.
I was exhausted, exhilarated and thankful. We had finally passed this hurdle, one of the most onerous political ordeals of my life. Many times I wondered if the results would justify the terrible political costs and the effort we had to exert. Each time, I decided that we simply could not afford to fail. Privately Torrijos praised us highly, but later he revealed to the public that he had given orders for the National Guard to attack and blow up the Canal if the Senate had rejected our agreement.