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Not even an irreversible breakthrough would automatically have helped Carter politically. The Administration had hoped that the hostages would be freed before Election Day, but feared that some hostages might denounce Carter for the way he handled the crisis. The President's men also were afraid of a backlash against the Administration for making concessions to Iran. That danger grew Sunday when it became clear that the Iranians were going to prolong the suspense and the agony for the U.S. — and thus almost inevitably intensify the impression worldwide that the U.S. was paying ransom to kidnapers.
Indeed, as it studied the matter, the White House grew alarmed that it had been checkmated politically by the rapidly evolving situation. Some of Carter's top aides believe that the President could not afford to accept the Iranian demands as they stood; on the other hand, they felt that Carter could not simply reject the conditions cold.
Reagan, meanwhile, was taking a cautious approach to the issue. Stopped on his way to church, he told reporters: "All I can tell you is that I think this is too sensitive to make any comment at all."
For several weeks there had been rumors that a hostage deal was imminent, and its broad outlines—Khomeini's four conditions—were well known. Another American inducement for Iran to free the hostages emerged during indirect negotiations conducted through Algeria, Switzerland, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and, TIME has learned, Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat. The battle-weary Iranian military, which relies on American equipment purchased under the Shah, desperately needs spare parts that the U.S. has refused to deliver because of the hostage crisis. The Administration has said that once the American hostages are free, Iran can have about $100 million worth of "nonlethal" military equipment that it has already ordered and paid for (e.g., spare parts for C-130 transport aircraft). So far, Iran has remained vague about whether it also insists on the immediate delivery of the guns, ammunition and other weaponry it had bought.
With the U.S. apparently willing to pay much of Khomeini's price, and with the war against Iraq going badly, the Majlis began moving to seal the deal. One obvious Iranian advantage: Carter's hope for a pre-election breakthrough. This leverage would be lost once the election was past no matter who was the victor: Carter would have less political reason to press for a deal, and Reagan's general attitude is uncompromising.
Everything seemed set a week ago. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Majlis, was sure he had enough support to put the deal to a vote. Back in Washington even the most skeptical officials were optimistic. But they, like Rafsanjani himself, neglected to reckon with the ingenuity of Iran's diehards —left-leaning Muslims and mullahs who opposed any compromise whatsoever with "the Great Satan America." On Thursday, the day set for the Majlis debate, about 70 deputies stayed home or refused to take their seats, preventing a quorum and thus blocking a vote.