Carter at the Crossroads

After a week of mulling the country's fate, he speaks out

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But to make headway against these problems, the President realized he also must start overcoming his chief political weakness, his reputation for hesitancy and indecision. Two weeks ago, returning from the Tokyo summit to a nation exasperated by a siege of gas lines, he compounded his difficulties by first scheduling a major policy speech on energy, then abruptly canceling it without a word of explanation. The Camp David summit, which began 48 hours later, represented above all an attempt to start rebuilding an image of purposeful leadership.

In one way it succeeded; many guests came away with new respect and sympathy for Carter. In another it probably would prove unsuccessful: it was unlikely that any Carter speech could live up to the expectations that surrounded his appearance on Sunday night. Ironically, on CBS-TV, the speech pre-empted a segment of Moses—The Lawgiver, a series that depicts Moses descending from Mount Sinai with the Ten Commandments.

Carter's Sunday-night goal was to appeal to the national sense of purpose and express confidence that the traditions of self-discipline and determination could solve even the most intractable problems.

His energy program, outlined on Sunday, was to be fleshed out in two Monday speeches, in Kansas City and Detroit. The most immediate improvement that Carter could mention on the energy front came in the form of news from abroad, that Saudi Arabia had agreed to increase its pumping of crude oil by 1 million bbl.

per day, to a new rate of 9.5 million bbl.

(Also announced late last week: a new $1.2 billion arms sale to the Saudis.) The additional Saudi oil would wipe out much of the shortage of crude in world markets, permit U.S. refineries to run faster (they in fact worked at 90% of capacity in early July, the best rate this year) and prevent the long gasoline lines of late June from reappearing this year. But the Saudi action emphasizes rather than relieves the U.S. dependence on foreign oil, and Carter himself fears that it might lessen the sense of crisis that could put the nation in a mood to take long-range action.

Though his decisions may lack high drama, Carter seemed to be settling on an ambitious series of energy measures.

He announced in advance, to the disappointment of some advisers, that he had "no intention" of lifting controls on gasoline prices because he thought the step would be too inflationary. Instead, his eventual program was expected to feature:

>Import quotas, effective immediately, flatly prohibiting the landing of more than 8.5 million bbl. per day—slightly more than now. That would fulfill a pledge Carter made at the Tokyo summit not to increase imports.

> Measures to force utilities to burn less oil. They would have to cut their use of oil 65% over the next decade, primarily by switching to coal.

> Formation of a "solar bank" to aid projects that would push the proportion of all U.S. energy supplied by solar power to 20% by the year 2000.

> Creation of an Energy Mobilization Board, similar to the old War Production Board, empowered to cut through the red tape that often strangles domestic energy projects. One possible example: clearing the way for a pipeline to carry Alaskan crude from California to Texas.

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