Beyond the issue of securing the release of the hostages in Iran, the biggest immediate problem facing the Carter Administration is how to manage the symbolism of the siege—and, perhaps more important, the symbolism of its aftermath. There is great danger that the spectacle of youthful radicals, backed by an aged and atavistic theocrat, humiliating and terrorizing American diplomatic personnel will have become a symbol of U.S. weakness. On the battlefield of domestic politics, the past two weeks offer Jimmy Carter's bi-partisan legion of opponents an almost irresistible target for sniping. All a skillful stump speaker has to do is lament "the decline of American power and prestige," and his listeners will grit their teeth at the memory of Uncle Sam, a goat's skull for a head, burning in effigy in Tehran while the perpetrators, in a dramatic gesture of their discipline and outrageousness, collect trash in Old Glory.
In the international community, the reaction is likely to be more diffuse, but not less damaging to the Administration. Staunch allies, such as the NATO countries and Japan, ought to be aghast at an incident that so vividly demonstrates the limits of their senior partner's power. Friendly states in the Middle East, like Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, will probably be more ambivalent: on the one hand, they may hope that the outrage will provoke the U.S. into playing a more assertive role in their region; on the other, they are sure to worry about how credible the U.S. performance will be. Said one prominent Saudi: "America has gotten a reputation for letting down its friends, and that won't be so easy to correct."
As for U.S. adversaries, particularly the Soviet Union, the events in Iran come as almost unmitigated good news, at least in the short run. The Kremlin is eager for the world, particularly the Third World, to believe that America is on the defensive, if not on the retreat. At the same time, the Soviet leadership is anxious to avoid the impression that the U.S.S.R. is leading the charge. That would violate the 1972 code of détente, which enjoins the superpowers from "efforts to obtain unilateral advantage," and it would jeopardize SALT II as well. Therefore, the Soviets prefer that the U.S. seem to be in a losing struggle not so much with a predatory Soviet Union as with the relentless "progressive" (i.e., anti-American) forces of history. In that sense Ayatullah Khomeini, his mobs and his minions are doing the Kremlin's work, even though they are not doing its bidding.
The Soviets concede privately that, in the longer term, the turmoil in Iran has potentially worrisome consequences for the U.S.S.R. Islamic fundamentalism is anathema to Communism, and the Ayatullah is religiously akin to the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia just across the border. On the other hand, the National Security Council last week pondered the possibility that anarchy in Iran could lead to a radical leftist takeover. No doubt the same possibility has occurred to Iran watchers in Moscow. That helps explain the ambiguity of Soviet behavior so far: provocative Farsi-language broadcasts from a Soviet radio station in Baku, combined with begrudging diplomatic support for the U.S. at the United Nations.