(7 of 8)
At week's end, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams were said to have told Washington that they believe the enemy drive will last for several months, until either victory is achieved or defeat is inevitable. Still most U.S. intelligence sources seem to think that the offensive, however intense, will be of limited duration. Within a month or so, monsoon rains will make movement and resupply difficult in most of the country. But in Military Region 1, where logistical support via the DMZ and Laos is relatively easy, the Communists could make trouble for a much longer time. President Thieu believes that the Communists may try to seize South Viet Nam's two northern provinces and use them as bargaining chips to force a negotiated settlement of the war.
Shock Waves. If Hue falls, the NVA might conceivably set up a "provisional government" of the long dormant National Liberation Front and the Viet Cong in the old capital. Washington believes that Hanoi will settle for a few "spectaculars"—perhaps the temporary occupation of a city or two—to embarrass Nixon and Thieu and perhaps force the U.S. to begin talking seriously about the Communist seven-point peace plan, which includes dumping the Thieu regime.
But what if ARVN and its air support hold fast and thwart the spectaculars? What if the Communists move back to their border sanctuaries without having inflicted a massive defeat? If that happens—and Washington is beginning to think optimistically of the prospect—North Viet Nam would have lost more than it did in Tet 1968. That furious onslaught created psychological shock waves in the U.S. and led to the beginning of American disengagement. From a military viewpoint, the post-TV counterattack by U.S. and ARVN troops was a considerable success: it virtually shattered the Viet Cong infrastructure and pushed main-force NVA units beyond South Viet Nam's borders.
If ARVN comes out of the current offensive in good shape, Hanoi might be willing—or so Washington believes—to negotiate a settlement along the lines of Richard Nixon's eight-point peace proposal. With its provisions for an Indochina-wide cease-fire and return of all troops to their national boundaries, Nixon's eight points add up to something close to unacceptable surrender for Hanoi. Most likely, the Washington speculation goes, a way would be found to allow the North Vietnamese to save face, and thus not feel obliged to return to the battlefield later on.
That is a highly wishful scenario, and it would be extraordinary if the North should follow it. Washington traditionally has inclined toward optimism in its thinking about the war. In Saigon, however, the prevalent opinion is that the current offensive is not the decisive thrust, but is aimed mainly at punishing ARVN and pushing it back from the border sanctuaries that the Communists have carved out over the past two years in Laos and Cambodia. With the reconstruction of the sanctuary network completed, and with the war-weary regimes in Phnom-Penh and Vientiane all but on the ropes, the North Vietnamese are turning their attention to South Viet Nam again. The immediate goal is not to topple Thieu in 1972, but to begin to rebuild the weakened Viet Cong and otherwise prepare to act on the day when the Americans and their airpower are really gone.