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Nixon's willingness to permit the recording of such language or possibly incriminatory material can be explained only by the hubris of the presidency, his absolute confidence that the tapes belonged to him and could never be wrested from him. The existence of the recorders was originally known only to a few Secret Service technicians and three trusted aides: Haldeman, Lawrence Higby and Alexander Butterfield. It was Butterfield who startlingly revealed the system in response to a throwaway question from a Senate Watergate-committee staff counsel on July 13. Even then the President must undoubtedly have felt that he could still protect the tapes with his claims of Executive privilege. Indeed, there had been discussions among those privy to the system about dismantling the recorders as early as six months after the Watergate burglary, and again when the cover-up began to unravel. But nothing was done. "He never in the world thought he would have to give up any of those tapes to anybody," insists one White House source.
Again common sense asks why, once the Watergate investigation began, Nixon did not destroy all of those tapes that even he concedes could be interpreted differently from the way he prefers? This could easily have been done before Butterfield revealed their existenceor even after, up until the time some were subpoenaed. Nixon was certainly under no legal obligation to keep them before they became sought-after evidence. It would have been embarrassing, of coursebut not criminalto have destroyed them in this interval.
Some former Nixon associates offer a plausible theory to explain why the tapes were kept available in the White House as the Watergate scandal unfolded and before the public was aware of the recording setup. If any member of the cover-up conspiracy were to make any false accusations about a talk with the President, Nixon could contend he had taped that conversation because he had felt it was especially important. Then he could produce the tape and destroy the credibility of the witness.
There is no clear indication yet of how damaging the tapes will prove to be for Nixon. Certainly his general reluctance to yield them to investigators has created widespread suspicion that they hurt rather than help his cause. So, too, has the report of a group of technical experts that part of one tape was deliberately erased. That conclusion is expected to be confirmed and strengthened when the panel presents its full scientific analysis, probably this week, to Federal Judge John Sirica in Washington. So far, two other tapes have been declared to be "nonexistent" by the White House. Never adequately explained has been the fact that Haldeman checked out 22 tapes on April 25, 1973, returned them the same day, then withdrew them again on April 26 and kept them until May 2. There is, indeed, still much to be explained about those fateful tapes that have contributed so much to Richard Nixon's difficulties and could even end his political career.
