WATERGATE: Seven Charged, a Report and a Briefcase

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Washington apartment. Liddy told the other two that certain "commitments" had been made to himself and others who had carried out the Watergate breakin. (Apparently the commitments were from Hunt to the others that if anything went wrong with the operation his White House friends would assist them and their families.)

June 24. Mitchell and Mardian met with Dean at Nixon re-election committee headquarters in Washington. Mitchell and Mardian suggested that Dean ask the CIA to provide secret funds for Hunt, Liddy and the five burglars who had been arrested in the breakin.

June 26. Ehrlichman met with Dean at the White House and approved a suggestion that Dean ask General Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the CIA, whether the CIA could use covert funds to pay salaries and bail for the arrested men. (Both Dean and Walters have testified that Dean did so.)

July 7. Anthony Ulasewicz, a former New York City policeman recruited to help distribute payments secretly to the break-in defendants, delivered approximately $25,000 in cash to William O. Bittman in Washington. Bittman was Hunt's attorney.

Mid-July. Mitchell and Kenneth Parkinson met with Dean at Nixon committee headquarters. Mitchell asked Dean to get FBI reports on the Watergate investigation for Parkinson and others. (Lawyer Parkinson was defending the Nixon re-election committee against a Democratic Party civil suit, and these reports could have been useful for this non-Governmental purpose.)

July 17. Ulasewicz delivered approximately $40,000 in cash to Howard Hunt's wife Dorothy at Washington National Airport. (She later died in a crash of a commercial plane, carrying $10,000 in cash at the time.)

July 21. Mardian met with Dean at the White House and examined FBI reports of its Watergate investigation. (Mardian, then a member of the Nixon committee staff, had no official right to see such documents.)

July 26. Ehrlichman met with Herbert Kalmbach, the President's personal lawyer, at the White House. He told Kalmbach to raise funds for the persons who had committed the break-in and that the fund raising and the payments should be kept secret. (This tends to back up Kalmbach's Senate testimony in which he related: "I said, 'John, I am looking right into your eyes ... it is just absolutely necessary, John, that you tell me, first, that John Dean has the authority to direct me in this assignment, that it is a proper assignment, and that I am to go forward on it.' He said, 'Herb. John Dean does have the authority. It is proper and you are to go forward.' ")

Aug. 29. Colson had a conversation with Dean in which Dean advised him not to send a memorandum to the authorities who were investigating the breakin. (The Colson memo reported that he had been interviewed by Justice Department investigators. But, the memo noted, they had failed to ask him about a meeting that he had held before the break-in with Liddy and Hunt. At that meeting the pair asked Colson for help in getting approval for their political intelligence-gathering plans. Investigators believe that by showing the memo to Dean, Colson made a clever attempt to protect himself and entrap Dean in the conspiracy. If asked later why he did not volunteer information about his meeting with Liddy and Hunt.

Colson would be able to cite Dean's orders to squelch the