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Broker's Role. Basically, the U.S. is trying to regain leverage for itself among the Arab states—an attempt the British and French have been making in order to diminish Soviet influence. Thus, when the Israelis described the U.S. moves as appeasement, Rogers objected to the word. "It suggests that the Arabs are enemies of the U.S.," he said. "Of course that isn't true."
One reason for the U.S. effort is obviously commercial, but equally important is the desire to restore normal relations with the Arabs without going back on the U.S. pledge to guarantee Israel's sovereignty. The effort is beginning to bear some fruit. Mauritania recently renewed diplomatic relations, which were ruptured during the 1967 war, and other states may follow suit. By shifting from the role of benefactor to broker, the U.S. hopes—and the hope is slender—that it may be able to restore peace to an area where warfare has become the daily routine. Last week, for instance, amid all the diplomatic harangues, Israel's military was having another busy time.
The air force mounted its largest assault since the 1967 war. For more than eight hours, jets roared over Suez, shooting up artillery emplacements and setting fires at Egypt's Suez refineries. The principal targets were surface-to-air missile sites, and the destruction of SAM sites was a warning to Egypt not to press too hard. It was also an indication that, for the time being, Israel would rather maintain the uncertain status quo than agree to any peace formula that would diminish its security.
While the U.S. and Israel were quarreling, so were the Arab states during their summit at Morocco's Rabat Hilton. The divisive agenda item was an Egyptian proposal that the other twelve members of the conference assist Egypt and Jordan by playing a greater part in the war against Israel. "I want to know whether you want to participate in the battle or not," Nasser demanded at the final working session. "I ask you please to tell me whether you want to fight." Earlier Egypt's Defense Minister, General Mohammed Fawzi, had unveiled a "mobilization plan" proposing that:
1) the oil-rich Arab states—Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—substantially increase the $356 million yearly subsidy that they already pay Egypt, Jordan and Yasser Arafat's guerrillas, and
2) the less wealthy nations increase troop contributions.
The proposal caused consternation. Saudi Arabia, citing heavy defense costs, objected to the higher subsidy. So did Kuwait, claiming recession troubles. In one exchange, Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who had gained power in a recent coup, urged Algeria to dispatch more men to Egypt. "It's all very well for you to tell us to send our armies to the front line," retorted Algeria's President Houari Boumedienne. "You can't do that yourself. Most of your officers are in jail." The Arab leaders finally approved the mobilization plan, but with nothing approaching unanimity. The vote was 9 to 4, with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia opposed and Kuwait abstaining.