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The recent public attacks drive some oilmen to outbursts of spluttering fury -but not the chiefs of Exxon. Emulating Jamieson, who is hard to ruffle, they discuss the most scorching criticisms in tones of sweet, if strained reason, conceding a point here and there to their critics. Exxon's world production boss, Hugh Goerner, even finds a good word for the environmentalists, who long held up the building of the Alaskan pipeline and have stopped oil companies from detonating certain explosives underwater to find oil deposits beneath the ocean floor. Spurred in part by environmentalists, he says, oilmen redesigned the Arctic pipeline to provide better protection for the environment, and Exxon has found ways to explore for offshore oil without killing fish. Some environmentalists, he asserts, go too far, but overall they have been a beneficial force: "They have pushed us into doing things that we probably should have done anyway."
In response to critics of the industry's high earnings during the period of oil shortage, Ken Jamieson tirelessly argues that Exxon's 1973 profits will be needed to finance the giant investments that the company must make to find, produce and refine new oil. This year Exxon plans to invest $3.7 billion in capital projects-or $1.3 billion more than its 1973 earnings. Those earnings, he notes, amounted to 1.90 on each gal. of oil products sold, and 18.8% on invested capital-no greater than 20 years ago.
Soft Answer. Even so, Exxon executives hint at willingness to accept higher U.S. taxes so long as Congress does not interfere with letting prices rise high enough to provide incentives for exploration and production. Stephen Stamas, vice president for public affairs, muses heretically that the industry might be better off now if some years ago there had been a gradual rise in prices, accompanied by a phase-out of the depletion allowance-which permits an oil producer to deduct from taxable income up to 22% of the revenue from a well. Today, says Jamieson, "what you have to do is look at the total package. Now if it takes a combination of measures-depletion allowance, excess-profits tax or some other form of taxation on the industry-why all right, but let's not take it one piece at a time."
In part, these opinions represent a resort to the soft answer that proverbially turneth away wrath. They also reflect the kind of company that Exxon is and the way that it trains its managers. Exxon's executives are expected to have an accommodating manner and a willingness to listen to others' ideas. The company operates through a maze of committees-management, finance, salaries, production-that seek by discussion to form a consensus among their members. On questions that he could resolve by simply issuing orders, even Jamieson frequently asks for and abides by votes of the nine-member management committee or the 17-member board of directors. Direct orders, indeed, are rare at all levels of the company. The standard Exxonism for a command is: "You may want to consider this."
In this atmosphere, Exxon's managers have great difficulty describing how decisions are