At first the accusations concerned only overt acts: murder, assault, rape, maiming. Last week, however, the formal charges spawned by the 1968 My Lai massacre took a dramatic and basic turn. Fourteen Army officers, including two already accused of murder, were cited for what they did not do—for not reporting the atrocities to higher authorities or not telling the truth during a subsequent inquiry. Two of the accused are generals, one of whom, Major General Samuel Koster, was until last week superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
The Army made its charges on the basis of a 3½-month investigation headed by Lieut. General William Peers. The probe was instituted to find out if there had in fact been a massacre and, if so, whether anyone had tried to hush it up. On the first point, General Peers said that his findings "clearly established that a tragedy of major proportions occurred there." On the second: "Certain individuals, either wittingly or unwittingly, by their action suppressed information from being passed up the chain of command." Of the total of 27 charges against the officers, 16 were for "failure to obey lawful regulations" or for "dereliction in the performance of duty."
Stony Visage. The announcement of the indictments came at a Pentagon briefing conducted by Army Secretary Stanley Resor. At his side stood General William C. Westmoreland, the American commander in Viet Nam at the time of My Lai and now Army Chief of Staff. His stony visage reinforced the impression that the Army indeed is convinced there was a massacre. It also bespoke the Army's determination to do everything possible to prove that it is now pressing the investigation as vigorously as possible.
Among those charged last week were Captains Ernest L. Medina and Thomas K. Willingham, who were both already accused of murdering civilians at My Lai. A key man in the new proceedings is Colonel Oran K. Henderson, commander of the brigade to which Medina's company and the task force belonged. He reported to Koster that nothing out of the way had happened at My Lai.
The Army's intention to cast a wide net was demonstrated by the fact that only four of the 14 officers were primary links in the company-to-division command chain or were alleged participants in the massacre. The others, who might be considered peripheral figures, include: Brigadier General George H. Young Jr., Koster's assistant commander in the Americal Division; Colonel Robert B. Luper, an artillery commander; Colonel Nels A. Parson Jr., Americal chief of staff; Lieut. Colonels David C. Gavin and William D. Guinn, American advisers serving with the South Vietnamese; Major Charles C. Calhoun, executive and operations officer of the task force that had responsibility for the sweep through My Lai; Major Robert W. McKnight, operations officer at the brigade level; Major Frederic W. Watke, commander of a helicopter company; Captain Kenneth W. Boatman, an artillery forward observer, and Captain Dennis H. Johnson, assigned to an intelligence detachment. Some have been charged with lying to the Peers panel; all are accused, one way or another, of failing to report the massacre.