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A Thick Prospectus. Next on Thieu's agenda is the follow-up on his own campaign promise of a bombing pause and an effort to talk with Hanoi about peace. The U.S. is willing to accede to a brief bombing pause that does not endanger U.S. lives in the battlefield, provided that Hanoi, as Dean Rusk said last week, comes through with "some response, some reciprocal action." But Hanoi has already publicly lambasted the notion of dealing with President-elect Thieu; privately, Washington has seen no alteration in the Communists' mood. Thieu himself has little faith that Hanoi will reply favorably and, in any case, he does not intend to call for a pause until "a week or ten days" after his inauguration next month.
The U.S., anxious that none of the momentum of Viet Nam's promising start in legitimate government be lost, has a thick prospectus of recommendations and reforms it hopes the new government will undertake. Among the most important: the elimination of corrupt and incompetent officers, and the army's reorganization so that it can fulfill its assigned mission of security and pacification in the countryside; the elimination of corruption throughout the government, and an influx of able civilians into government.
Less Leverage. Thieu's own list for what he calls his "first six months" is virtually the same. Fifty military officers, from generals down to second lieutenants, will be disciplined or cashiered, he says. The armed forces will be reorganized and troops transferred from divisional commands to province-chief control for use in pacification. Probably half of the country's 44 province chiefs will be replaced, as corruption is punished, performance rewarded, and the general quality of these key positions upgraded. Finally, "something" will be done to deliver on the Manila Conference's promise of "national reconciliation" for Viet Cong who defect to the government's side.
The U.S. is well aware that its leverage and influence in Saigon are likely to diminish under an elected government. Thieu will not be dealing with a rubber-stamp congress any more than Lyndon Johnson does. Some measures that both he and the U.S. want may be rejected by the Vietnamese legislature, particularly if Thieu fails to mobilize a majority in the Senate and the House. But given U.S. determination to help South Viet Nam create a viable nation, that is a small price to pay.
The Vietnamese, in all their long and agonized history, have never had a government they could truly call their own, or even one that responded to their needs and listened to their complaints. Last week's election was a fairer and surer step in that direction than most had dared hope.