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Malinovsky's rumblings failed to frighten U.S. allies. The Bonn General-Anzeiger dismissed them as "routine stage thunder." The Pakistan Times denounced Soviet "brinkmanship" (a term that the U.S. press tied to the late John Foster Dulles, seldom applies to Brinkman Khrushchev), added that Pakistan "cannot be thrown into a state of perplexity by threats from any quarter, or allow its power of decision to be paralyzed by bluster."
After the Malinovsky scowl came a Khrushchev smile of sorts. In a clumsy effort to foster division within the U.S., Khrushchev sent a conciliatory message to four top U.S. Democrats—Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, House Speaker Sam Rayburn, Chairman William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Adlai Stevenson—who had urged him to reconsider his insistence that no summit conference could be held until after the 1960 presidential election. Said Khrushchev in his reply: he regrets that President Eisenhower "wrecked" the summit conference, and he knows that the Administration's "doctrine of aggression and provocation" is "not in line with the great democratic traditions of the American nation, traditions of Washington and Jefferson, Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt."
Price in Blood. Then came another smile, in the form of a sweeping Khrushchev disarmament plan that was at once a seeming concession to the Western demand for inspection and at the same time an unacceptable demand for the dismantling of deterrent strength before inspection could begin (see FOREIGN NEWS). Khrushchev called his press conference in Sverdlov Hall for the announced purpose of explaining his disarmament plan, but in his very first reply to a question, the scowl reappeared. Asked to explain Marshal Malinovsky's warning, Khrushchev said that it was to be taken "literally."
To make sure U.S. allies got the point, Khrushchev hammered hard at it: "This should especially give food for thought to the leaders of those countries which surround the Soviet Union and where there are American bases. If these bases are used by the Americans against us, the Soviet Union will hit at the bases." [Applause.] The U.S.'s promise that it would stand behind its allies if Russia hits at the bases, Khrushchev went on, was like saying, "Don't be afraid; we will attend your funeral when you have been smashed." [Animation.] Furthermore, Khrushchev added, the commander of Soviet rocket forces, Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin, has authority to use nuclear warheads in striking at U.S. airbases. But in answer to a later question, he was conveniently vague as to who had the authority to order an attack.
Pounding away in his campaign to frighten U.S. allies into denying airbases to the U.S.—a prime and constant aim of Soviet policy—Khrushchev kept rephrasing the rocket warning in replies to later press conference questions. Nations where U.S. bases are located would suffer the "first blow" in any hot war, would "pay the price in blood," he blustered. "To put the matter in a nutshell, we have a general staff, and they have the locations of these bases marked with circles."
Between bursts of rocket rattling and blasts at the President of the U.S., Nikita Khrushchev: