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Past midnight Bissell and Cabell restudied the battle plan while signals of consternation welled up from their men far to the south. At 4 o'clock, less than an hour before first light on the Cuban shore, Cabell went back to Rusk with another proposal. It was manifestly impossible for the Cuban Brigade's small force of B-26s (only 16 were operational) to provide effective air cover for the ships from their distant base. Cabell now asked whether, if the ships were to pull back to international water, the U.S.S. Boxer, a carrier on station about 50 miles from the Bay of Pigs, could be instructed to provide cover. Rusk said no. The President was awakened. Cabell registered his concern. The answer still was no.
The End. The invasion force had little chance. They were without the ranging fire power which the B-26s with their bombs and machine guns had been expected to apply against Castro's tanks and artillery. Castro's forces came up fast. He still had four jets left, and they were armed with powerful rockets. He used them well. Before the morning was done he had sunk two transports and driven off two others.
Now Kennedy and his strategists became alarmed. About noon on Monday, Bissell was told that the B-26s could attack Castro's airfields at will. But the orders came too late. Most of the pilots had been in the air for upward of 18 hours in an unavailing effort to keep Castro's planes off the troops and the remaining ship. That night a small force was scratched together. It was over Cuba at dawn, only to find the fields hidden by low, impenetrable fog.
Tuesday was the turning point. The men ashore had fought bravely and gained their planned objectives. They had even seized and bulldozed the airfield. But they were desperately short of ammunition and food, and under the pressure of Castro's superior fire power and number they were being forced back across the beach. There remained one last chance to make the thing go. Boxer was still on station. The release of a few of its jets simply for air cover should see two landing craft with ammunition and rations safely to the shore.
At a White House meeting that night, Bissell made it plain that unless U.S. air power was brought forward, the men on the beach were doomed. He asked that Boxer's planes be brought into the battle. Rusk still would not have this. Several others were also opposed, including the President's personal staffers. Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke vouched for the worth of Bissell's proposition. The outcome of the meeting was a singular compromise. Jets from Boxer would provide cover next morning for exactly one hour, long enough for the ships to run into the shore and start unloading and for the remaining B-26s to get in a hard blow.
Next morning, through an incredible mischance, the B-26s were over Cuba half an hour ahead of schedule. Boxer's jets were still on the flight deck. But Castro's jets were ready. Two of the B-26s were shot down; others were hit and forced to abort. That was the melancholy end.