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At first, the Russians treated the U-2 as a useful propaganda weapon to supplement the tough talk with which Khrushchev hoped to extract Western concessions. In his first outcries over the U2, Nikita was careful not to foreclose negotiations with the U.S. at the summit. As late as May 6, Russia's Chief Air Marshal Konstantin Vershinin was still cheerily urging the U.S. air attache in Moscow to accompany him on a long-planned courtesy tour of U.S. air bases. In a Czech embassy reception speech lambasting the Pentagon (TIME, May 23), Khrushchev himself made a point of stating that he was "convinced of the ethical qualities" of U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn E. Thompson. Above all, Khrushchev significantly suggested that, in all probability, his good friend Ike had not even known about the U-2 flights.
The Personal Touch. When Eisenhower declared that he was personally responsible for the overflights and Secretary of State Herter implied that the flights would go on, it must have been a bitter blow for Khrushchev, who had been assuring his comrades that Eisenhower was a man he could handle. But if personally stung, he and the Presidium must have had painful second thoughts about this stance on the part of the U.S. Before the eyes of the world, Russia's vaunted defenses had been shown incapable of halting the U-2s.
In his anger and humiliation, Nikita revealed in Paris something of what he presumably had suffered inside the Presidium. He burst out: "What would you think of your government if it treated with indifference, with unconcern, the overflights of your cities by military planes . . . Would you respect such a government? Would your families and you yourselves feel safe listening to the drone of an alien plane over your heads?'' Later, in East Berlin, he made the grievance more personal, exclaiming bitterly: "There was a wry smile on the faces of President Eisenhower, Herter, Nixon and, above all, Allen Dulles, when they anticipated the meeting in Paris where Eisenhower would glance at Khrushchev and think: 'What is the use of trying to convince us here? U.S. planes flew over the territory of the Soviet Union, and you could not do anything and nevertheless came to Paris.' "
The Russians, cool strategists even if given to hot flashes, had decided to torpedo an unprofitable summit. But perhaps the vehemence with which Khrushchev set out to destroy Ike as his pet U.S. peacemaker and as the shiny symbol of the possibility of relaxation of tensions owed something to Khrushchev's pride and anger alone. Signs indicate that the policy reversal took place almost literally overnight. Within 24 hours of Ike's public endorsement of the U-2 flights came the tipoffs: Khrushchev's remarks at the U-2 exhibit in Gorky Park that Eisenhower would probably not be welcome in Russia, and the abrupt, last-minute cancellation of Air Marshal Vershinin's U.S. visit.