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A Reason to Fight. That is obviously the magic the U.S. needs in Southeast Asia. The staggering U.S. task is not only to order the Red guerrillas back into their holes. Americans are told on all sides that they must give Southeast Asia's people something to fight for, some overwhelming reason why a poor, semiliterate population, ignorant of political freedom and without a smattering of political philosophy, should be ready to die fighting Communism. In effect, this is asking the U.S. to create new, viable societies—which the French notably failed to do during their rule. And the French had centuries for it; the U.S. only ten years ago moved into the vacuum left by France, and is now berated in Paris for not wanting to give up too.
De Gaulle's plans for neutralization of Viet Nam and the whole region look attractive on the surface. He plausibly speaks of a political solution where a military one is impossibly difficult, of giving the countries involved another choice besides the often deadly one between Communism or the U.S. Appealing though the thought might be for the U.S. to get out of what, at best, can only be more years, if not decades, of fighting, the French plan breaks down because a neutral area so close to Red China and already so deeply infiltrated by Communists seems unthinkable.
One-Sided Neutralism. An international political miracle would have to be performed to keep neutralization from turning most of Southeast Asia into one major Laos—or worse. And in Laos, even Sihanouk himself admits that neutrality is "an impossible dream." The French themselves, who started out by claiming that all of Viet Nam could be neutralized, now admit that it really comes down to neutralizing South Viet Nam only. The Chinese would never permit it in the north.
Not that North Viet Nam does not have its troubles. Ho Chi Minh's Communist Lao Dong party is divided between its pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions, and "Uncle" Ho has his hands full keeping things in balance. Rice rations were trimmed last month for the third time in a year, sugar grows increasingly short, meat is a luxury available only to the army and select workers —and then a ration of only three-quarters of a pound per week. Even coal and steel production, of which Hanoi was once so proud, is lagging. And though Ho Chi Minh continues to direct and aid the subversive war against South Viet Nam, for all his bluster he seems nervous about the possibility of stepped-up U.S. support of Saigon—or the war's being carried to his own country.
Awaited Demonstration. Washington last week launched a poster campaign urging Americans to support the South Viet Nam war effort and stressing the U.S. commitment there. In its way, the drive underlined the fact that, in the end, it is only in Viet Nam that a real answer can be made to Sihanouk and others who think as he does. Only there can the U.S. prove that he is wrong in believing that Red China will win in Southeast Asia—if he is wrong. Troublesome and sometimes irrational though he may be, Cambodia's Prince undoubtedly represents the feelings, spoken or unspoken, of many another Asian leader sitting under the shadow of the widely hated Chinese dragon—and unsure how long the U.S. can hold the monster at bay.