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Other leaders in the Middle East have tried to do what Naguib hopes to do. Only Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, has succeeded. The press has hopefully called Naguib another Ataturk, and in some ways they are alike. Like Ataturk, Naguib is a soldier, born in an embattled frontier province (Ataturk in Salonika, now part of Greece; Naguib in Khartoum); like Ataturk, Naguib, relying on the army to uphold him, seeks to transform an ancient Moslem monarchy into a modern democratic state. But Naguib, a simpler man, lacks Ataturk's grasp of politics, his vision, his rousing oratory; he may also lack his iron will to rule.
Nevertheless, both U.S. and British diplomats and newsmen, who have watched Naguib's first two months as Egypt's reluctant strong man, hope that in his own, quieter way he will succeed. Whether he does or not will ultimately depend on a big if—U.S. and British aid.
Simply to stay in power, Naguib needs arms to keep order, technical assistance to make land reform work, capital to build factories and raise Egypt's living standards. Last month he made a bid for U.S. and British military aid. Prime Minister Aly Maher requested U.S. Point Four funds to finance a vast development program which would 1) double cotton production in the Nile Delta, 2) reclaim 3,000,000 acres of the Western Desert for cattle grazing, 3) expand industrial output. "The good that American experts could do for Egypt," said Aly Maher, "is incalculable."
The British have responded by lifting their embargo on arms shipments to Egypt and by announcing that they would help train Egyptian officers. But they are moving cautiously: they know that eventually Naguib will have to raise the issue of British troops at Suez and British control of the Sudan. Naguib is known to be far less hostile to Britain than the Wafd, and is believed to favor Egyptian participation in some kind of Middle Eastern defense setup. But the British are afraid that open support of Naguib would cost him popularity, since Egyptians of all parties profess to regard friendship with Britain as treason. "We're for him, all right," said a British Foreign Office official. "But we don't particularly want to advertise the fact."
The U.S. State Department is even more cautious. U.S. foreign policy has already antagonized the whole Arab world by giving aid to Israel, but the State Department still seems determined to do nothing that would offend Israel. Thought of the Jewish vote in November is an added reason for the Administration's attitude. So far. Dean Acheson let it be known that the price of U.S. arms aid to Egypt would be 1) Egypt's settling its differences with Israel, and 2) Egypt's joining the Middle Eastern Defense Organization proposed by the British. Naguib might possibly favor both proposals, in private, but he cannot accept them without giving the Wafd enough propaganda ammunition to endanger his regime.