French Morocco is the site of the latest American invasion, peaceful but hectic, bringing airmen and planes and contractors with millions of dollars to spend.
The five big air bases which the U.S. is building in the northwest corner of Africa will handle anything that S.A.C. (the U.S. Strategic Air Command) now has or will have for years to come, including the jet-powered B-47 and the experimental XB-52. From Morocco, S.A.C. will be in easy range of Soviet targets in the Ukraine, the Caucasus oilfields—in fact, any targets in European Russia, from Moscow to the southern frontier. Yet the Moroccan bases are almost unreachable from the U.S.S.R. by land. To take them, short of an airborne assault, the Red Army would have to skirt the eastern Mediterranean and cross the whole of North Africa. "European bases may give us 10% more hitting power," says one Air Force officer, "but Morocco gives us 90% more staying power."
The Crash Program. There was good reason for hurrying into Morocco. But, largely because of the hurry, the whole Morocco air base program last week was in trouble, both actual and potential. The actual trouble—which can be cured—is due to waste and inefficiency in the construction job itself. The potential trouble, which may be harder to deal with, is a whole complex of problems arising from French-Arab-U.S. relations.
The U.S.-French agreement for the bases was made in December 1950, at a time when the U.S. was threatened with defeat in Korea, and when Eisenhower had not yet arrived in Europe to help shore up its defenses. Base construction in Morocco got under way as what the Pentagon calls a "crash" program, in which speed is all-important and waste must be borne. The first estimate of total cost, $300 million, has now soared to $455 million.
The Army Corps of Engineers sent out white-mustached Colonel George T. Derby, a veteran of the Pacific war, to do the job. Derby let the contracts to a pool of five U.S. companies, operating together as "Atlas Constructors," on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis (the fee being something over $5,000,000).
Alarmed by the costs, the Air Force twice lowered the time priority on finishing the bases. Still the costs stayed high, and Senator Lyndon Johnson's Preparedness ("Watchdog") subcommittee got curious. Army Secretary Frank Pace also got busy. Last week he notified Senator Johnson that he had relieved Colonel Derby, that efforts would be made to recover any money "improperly spent"; and that Atlas Constructors had been ordered to mend their ways or go.
The Unfinished Three. Some of the blame belongs to the Air Force, and its costly indecision in choosing a site for the largest of the five bases. First it was persuaded by the French to settle on Ben Guerir, in the rocky flatlands at the foot of the Atlas Mountains. Then the Air Force switched the site to a place called Mechra Bel Ksiri, where $120,000 was spent before it was learned that Mechra Bel Ksiri is flooded for part of each year. Now the work is going forward again at Ben Guerir.
Two other bases, at Sidi Slimane and Nouasseur are already "operational," though not yet equipped with the amenities of life. The remaining three are supposed to be finished by July, but won't be.