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¶ After President Truman ordered an H-bomb go-ahead in 1950, Oppenheimer "did not oppose the project in a positive or open manner, nor did he decline to cooperate." But his 1949 views in opposition "became widely known among scientists, and since he did not make it known that he had abandoned these views, his attitudes undoubtedly had an adverse effect on recruitment of scientists . . . In other words the board finds that if Dr. Oppenheimer had enthusiastically supported the thermonuclear program . . . the H-bomb project would have been pur sued with considerably more vigor."
In the context of the atomic arms race with Russia, the board's conclusion was as grave an indictment as has ever been brought against an influential American since the cold war began: "The opposition to the H-bomb by many persons connected with the atomic energy program, of whom Dr. Oppenheimer was the most experienced, most powerful and most effective member, did delay the initiation of concerted effort which led to the development of a thermonuclear weapon . . . We cannot dismiss the matter . . . simply with the finding that [Oppenheimer's] conduct was not motivated by disloyalty, because it is our conclusion that, whatever the motivation, the security interests of the U.S. were affected."
To this the Gray board majority appended a cryptic statement that seemed to refer to Oppenheimer's strenuous, behind-the-scenes efforts to turn U.S. air power away from an emphasis on offensive power to one based on defense. "We are concerned . . . that he may have departed his role as scientific adviser to exercise highly persuasive influence in matters in which his convictions were not necessarily a reflection of technical judgment, and also not necessarily related to the protection of the strongest offensive military interests of the country. In the course of the proceedings, there developed other facts which raised questions of such serious import as to give us concern about whether the retention of Dr. Oppenheimer's services would be clearly consistent with the security interests of the U.S."
A Black Mark. Troubled reaction to the findings began right on the board, with Dr. Evans' minority report. "[Oppenheimer] did not hinder the development of the H-bomb, and there is absolutely nothing in the testimony to show that he did," he wrote. "His statements in cross-examination show him to be still naive but extremely honest, and such statements work to his benefit in my estimation . . . No one on the board doubts his loyalty . . . and he is certainly less of a security risk than he was in 1947 when he was cleared [by a Truman loyalty board] . . . His judgment was bad in some cases, and most excellent in others, but, in my estimation, it is better now than it was in 1947, and to damn him now and ruin his career and his service, I cannot do it . . . I personally think that our failure to clear Dr. Oppenheimer will be a black mark on the escutcheon of our country . . . I am worried about the effect an improper decision may have on the scientific development in our country."