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"The airmen . . . want to fight their own kind of war. Or rather they want more of what is left of this war to be fought their way. The airmen, from the beginning, have been at odds with the Russian argument for a land front of the orthodox sort in the west. They are equally unimpressed with the prospects in the Balkans.
"From bitter experience the airmen know that as soon as large numbers of men and ships become committed to a campaign, the generals and admirals start calling unceasingly for air power—for fighters to provide them with cover, for bombers to harass and pulverize the enemy. This sets up an unending drain upon the strategic air force which the airmen have been trying to build up in Britain for the destruction of the German war economy."
But strategic airmen, even in voicing these plaints, realize that they are too late. For better or worse, the adopted —and working—Allied strategy has already ruled out an air offensive on the airmen's scale. What they now ask is that the Allied high commands, having limited the aerial objective to one of attrition in support of ground and naval forces, allow the airmen to do their utmost within the new limit. As one high-ranking airman told Murphy: "We don't want the overall strategy changed in time, but only bent a little in favor of air."
West v. South. The assertion of these views has produced some enlightening debate in both London and Washington. Some of the points raised:
> By failing to press the air attack home with sufficient aircraft, the Allies have misused their greatest opportunity of the war and have allowed the Germans to correct the mistake they made in not anticipating the growth of Allied air power. Eighteen months ago the Germans had only a handful of experimental night fighters; now the Luftwaffe has 700 first-line night fighters. 1,800 fighters of all types in the west.
> Unless U.S. air strength in Britain is greatly increased, U.S. losses will continue at the high but not yet prohibitive October rate of 174 bombers in the first 23 days (seven raids on twelve cities). Because U.S. allocations of bombers to Britain are lower than expected, British bomber losses are all the more serious.
> The drain of bombers to the Mediterranean curtailed bombing from Britain, affected air crews' morale, and raised some questions which are still unanswered. With in a 600-mile radius of Britain's airdromes lie the principal industrial targets of western Europe. Southern Italian bases are actually farther than British bases from Nazi industry's "golden triangle." The assumption that mild Mediterranean weather, opportunities for shuttle-bombing from west and south, and other advantages would immediately alter the bombing picture were premature. It will take time to build up in southern Europe a strategic air base equal to that already built in Britain; winter weather over the targets in Germany is the same, whether bombers come from the west or south.