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The British position is that, in wartime, Gandhi's mysticism, his saintliness, his idiosyncrasies and his shrewd playing of politics do not excuse treasonable acts. As blunt as a lathi is the Government's claim that Gandhi is both an appeaser and pro-Japanese traitor.
In Nehru the British have seen a fine mind, an incorruptible honor, an intelligent approach to world problems. But they distrust him because of his faith in Gandhi and an emotionalism which led him to say: "We prefer to throw ourselves into the fire and come out a new nation or be reduced to ashes." To finish off their case against Gandhi and Nehru, the British official position is that Gandhi's voice is not the voice of India. They claim that his party is losing power, that it cannot possibly represent all of India's heterogeneous peoples and makes no attempt to do so. If immediate independence were granted to India, it would mean a one-party political dictatorship, immediate civil war and chaos that would provide easy entry for Japanese invaders.
Counter-Claims. The Indian view, as brought back to the U.S. last week by Correspondent Louis Fischer after a week's conversations with Gandhi, is that the British are "smearing" Gandhi and wooing U.S. public support of an oppressive, undemocratic and inefficient Indian and colonial policy. Sir Stafford Cripps, said Fischer, at first led Indian leaders to believe that they would receive a free rein in running their affairs. Subsequently, said Fischer, Sir Stafford was tripped up by Empire politicians. Amidst a wealth of verbiage and argument, Fischer found a sound point in claims that free Indians would fight invading Japanese; and that, inversely, if India's long-smoldering hatred of the British is fanned, the Indians may be apathetic to "new masters."
Although Gandhi once may have been flirting with the Japanese, either out of unworldly wisdom or as a counterfoil to the British, the final draft of the "Quit India" resolution was pro-Ally. Also on the record is Gandhi's petulant manifesto last fortnight to the Japanese: "Our offer to let the Allies retain troops in India is to prevent you from being misled into feeling that you have but to step into this country. If you cherish any such idea, we will not fail to resist you with all the might we can muster."
The Spectators. Said a leader in the New Delhi Evening National Call: "Britain has opened up a second front. The blitz is on. . . . She has drawn first blood. There is thunder in the clouds and lightning flashes surcharge the horizon." But the green, white and gold banners of the Congress party hung limp and forlorn from Hindu shops in Delhi. Just as forlorn were U.S. officials in India. Quietly, quiet Lauchlin Currie, special U.S. envoy to the Chinese government, slipped into town. After him came Lieut. General Joseph W. Stilwell, Chiang Kai-shek's Chief of Staff and Commander of U.S. Forces in China, Burma and India. Representatives of a nation which 167 years ago rebelled against British imperial rule, they were witnesses to another struggle for freedom. Plain to see was the tragedy of India. Not so plain was the part that the U.S., with all the good will in the world, could play.