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The Soviet bluster, some argue, may be little more than a negotiating tactic. This view is held by many in the Reagan Administration. By deliberately fostering an atmosphere of tension, the argument goes, the Kremlin might exact concessions it could not gain through diplomatic channels. Given Moscow's almost pathological antipathy for Reagan, the Soviets could also be trying to influence the outcome of the U.S. elections by allowing the Democrats to paint the President as a man not to be trusted with his finger on the nuclear button. One significant danger of the present situation, according to an American specialist in Soviet affairs, is that the U.S. "can no longer count on measured and rational responses" from the Soviets. Says he: "There is no taut line of control in Moscow. The soft leadership situation means that we cannot extrapolate their responses from past behavior."
Ever since Leonid Brezhnev became seriously ill, the Soviet Union has had no strong direction from the top. As Brezhnev's health deteriorated, decision making was virtually paralyzed. His successor, Andropov, began his tenure by projecting a forceful image, particularly in cracking down on corruption, absenteeism and economic inefficiency. But soon he too was mortally ill; from Aug. 18, 1983, until his death last February, he was not seen in public. Again, decisions were postponed as his colleagues waited and presumably maneuvered for position.
The Kremlin's leadership crisis became even more apparent when, after four days of deliberation following Andropov's death, the Communist Party Central Committee announced that Chernenko had been named to the top position. Known more for his loyalty to Brezhnev than for his expertise in any area except the party bureaucracy, Chernenko had been conspicuously passed over 15 months earlier when Andropov succeeded Brezhnev; indeed, there was some speculation that Andropov had shunted his erstwhile rival aside.
The consensus among Western experts today is that although Chernenko quickly collected all the titles that Brezhnev and Andropov held (General Secretary of the Communist Party and President, as well as Chairman of the Defense Council), he in fact merely shares power with Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko. It is the latter who, after more than a quarter-century as the executor of other men's policies, is thought to have been most instrumental in shaping the current hard line. There seems to be no one powerful enough to rein him in. Adam Ulam, director of Harvard's Russian Research Center, suspects that "Gromyko is making up for the time he was an errand boy for Khrushchev and Brezhnev." Says Richard F. Staar, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution: "Gromyko has always been a hardliner. He's delighted now to perform that function as the official spokesman for the party."