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Goukouni and his 3,000-man army began their comeback two months ago. With the help of Libya, they quickly seized a third of the country's territory, including the towns of Abéché and Faya-Largeau. The following month, fortified with a new shipment of French arms, Habré's forces retook the two towns. They were on the verge of turning Goukouni's retreat into a rout when Gaddafi entered the war with troops and airpower.
If they were left to their own devices, the Chadians could probably fight on indefinitely without causing undue concern to the outside world. But they have rarely been left alone. Gaddafi, who seized a strategic portion of northern Chad known as the Aozou Strip a decade ago, has dreamed of creating an Islamic empire that would span Africa from the Red Sea to the Atlantic. France is highly sensitive to any Libyan intrusion into French-speaking Africa, particularly if it might affect such valued allies and trading partners as Ivory Coast, Senegal and Zaire. The U.S. opposes any extension of Libyan power, which would inevitably be followed by a strengthening of Soviet influence. A special concern is that Gaddafi has long sought to destabilize two stalwart U.S. allies, Egypt and the Sudan.
Washington and Paris have not reacted particularly harmoniously to the rising crisis in Chad. The U.S. provided military assistance but expected France to contribute both combat troops and airpower. Mitterrand, however, has been more reluctant than his predecessors to become involved in the shifting sands of the Saharan war. Before his election in 1981, he opposed interventions by Presidents Charles de Gaulle and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in the affairs of France's former colonies. In addition, Mitterrand knows that French moves into Chad in 1968 and 1978 were costly operations that had little lasting effect. A particular irony is that on both occasions Habré was a leader of the rebel forces that France opposed. Mitterrand is also hesitant to become involved in an open fight with Libya, a trading partner with which France has managed to maintain correct relations.
As Mitterrand pondered his options, French and U.S. military officials discussed a possible joint military operation, which would include use of the AWACS planes. The White House misunderstood a French suggestion about helping defend Faya-Largeau, not realizing that the French had made contingency plans but no final decision. A senior State Department official later admitted, "The White House was naive. No French political leader said, 'We are going to [defend] Faya.' " As U.S. pressure for French support continued, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson declared testily, "We do not submit to American desires, and we have no reason to act only with the Americans or systematically with the Americans."
By the end of the week, however, as the military situation in Chad worsened, the French sent in some 300 troops from bases in Cameroon, the Central African Republic and southern France. Then, after Libyan aircraft continued to bomb government outposts, the French dispatched a company of paratroops from the capital to Abéché, a clear sign that they were slowly stepping up their commitment to Habré's government.