The Shakeup at State

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Haig was convinced that American sanctions would not then stop the building of the pipeline or cancel the European commitment to it. He thought he could satisfy Reagan's desire to be tough on the Soviets by getting the Europeans to pledge that they would limit government-subsidized loans to the U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw Pact allies. They understood him to promise that if such a pledge were written into the final Versailles communique, there would be no further American moves against the pipeline. The communique did contain a vague promise to study restrictions on loans to the East bloc, and Haig tried to convince Reagan that this supposed commitment was a U.S. victory. In fact, the language was so weak as to be almost meaningless.

Clark believed that Haig had misrepresented the President's position, and he therefore set out to tighten restrictions on the pipeline. He called a meeting of the National Security Council in Washington on June 18—a day when, as he knew, Haig was scheduled to be in New York City conferring with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. At the urging of Clark, Weinberger and others, Reagan at the NSC meeting not only reaffirmed the original ban but ruled that U.S. companies could not permit their foreign subsidiaries, or foreign companies with American licenses, to make equipment for the pipeline either. The Europeans felt doublecrossed. Even British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, an anti-Soviet hardliner, registered a strong protest. Haig stormed that Reagan and Clark had destroyed his credibility in any future negotiations with the Europeans.

A potentially far more dangerous storm was simultaneously brewing. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was due at the White House, and the Administration had to decide what to say to him about the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Clark and Weinberger thought that Reagan should at least raise the threat of sanctions if the fighting did not stop. Some Administration hard-liners were even discussing possible moves. They included withdrawing Ambassador Samuel Lewis from Tel Aviv, giving American support to a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israel (the U.S. has vetoed such resolutions to date) and finally cutting off arms aid that Israel needs. The hard-liners were moved by shock at the civilian casualties caused by the Israeli invasion and also by fear that the Arab world would interpret American silence as a sign that the U.S. agrees with, and may even have helped to instigate, the violence.

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