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Kissinger notes that his concept of "linkage"—insisting that the Soviets exercise restraint in international conduct in return for trade arrangements or technology exchanges—had long been decried as "an unworkable relic of the cold war." Now detractors of linkage not only adopted the theory, "they went us one better." Says Kissinger: "They linked most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union not only with Soviet foreign-policy conduct but with Soviet emigration practices. During Nixon's first term we had, by quiet diplomacy, raised Jewish emigration from 400 a year in 1968 to 35,000 by 1973, and we had obtained a Soviet promise to increase the figure to 45,000. Senator Jackson, acting like a man who, having won once at roulette, organizes his yearly budget in anticipation of a recurrence, kept raising the ante." Jackson demanded that the Administration insist on 100,000 of all nationalities and specify the geographic areas from which they should be drawn. "Our policy toward the Soviets was based on a balance between the carrot and the stick," writes Kissinger. But a combination of Watergate and the new liberal-conservative coalition destroyed the carrot and "we were not given a bigger stick either."
Some argued that détente was sapping our defense effort. This was standing history on its head. In Nixon's first term, before detente had been heard of, the President had to battle against congressional cuts, amounting to some $40 billion in 1970 dollars, assaults on new weapons and a concerted effort to withdraw our forces even from Western Europe.
We never believed détente would ease our defense burden. Nixon, with my encouragement, consistently picked the highest budget option presented by the Defense Department. But the challenge turned out to be defense direction even more than defense spending. The basis of our strategy since 1945 had been the reliance on superior American strategic nuclear power to compensate for the Soviets' advantage in conventional forces and proximity to key areas. By 1973 the Soviets had achieved parity in numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and superiority in throw weight (the total aggregate weight of warheads). Thus resort to strategic nuclear war became less and less credible. The prohibitive price of a nuclear exchange was as likely to inhibit resistance as to discourage aggression. "Better Red than dead" turned from a parody into a program.
One overriding fact remains: an all-out strategic nuclear exchange would risk life as we know it. In no postwar crisis has a U.S. President come close to using strategic nuclear weapons. There was thus no more urgent task for American defense policy than to increase substantially the capacity for local resistance. But a buildup of conventional forces was decried as dangerous because it would tempt distant adventures, or as too costly.