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Even some U.S. intelligence sources admitted they had doubts about the reliability of their informants. Said one official: "Gaddafi has been a bastard for ten years. He's been making threats against the President and the U.S. for ten years. Is he serious now? There's a lot of loose talk and allegations out there. Separating that from the truth is the problem." Others believed Gaddafi's long record of making threats was reason enough to take the reports seriously. They pointed out that the unpredictable Gaddafi, faced with an increasingly unfriendly U.S. Administration, might feel he has no choice. "He is scared," said an Israeli foreign ministry official. "Therefore, he may be hitting back." Gaddafi may believe the U.S. wants to kill him. "He has thought since the late 1970s that we were prepared to undo him," said a CIA official. "It is the behavior of America, preparing to assassinate me, to poison my food," said Gaddafi last week. "They tried many things to do this."
On Capitol Hill, a majority of Senators and Representatives were willing to believe that the hit-team threat exists. Some Congressmen, in fact, were ready to impose sanctions on Libya even before Reagan announced the travel restriction. "The situation is serious enough to warrant the level of precautions," said Republican Senator Harrison Schmitt of New Mexico, who was briefed by the CIA. "I don't think the Administration is making it up," said Democratic Representative Albert Gore Jr. of Tennessee, who also had a CIA briefing. "There's ample evidence that this is a very real threat."
One of the mysteries about the hit team accounts was how details were gradually leaked to the press until, as Senator Dodd put it, the story began "taking on a life of its own." It first became public in mid-November, after reporters began noticing tighter security measures around Reagan and other top officials. The White House vigorously attempted to discourage news coverage of both the threats and the security precautions. Reporters seeking to confirm details of the story with Government officials were advised not to overreact. But as the days passed, the story was enhanced in tantalizing bits and pieces until what had started as rumor became a full-fledged scare. Soon the White House, FBI and Secret Service found themselves forced to react, partly in response to the publicity. Reagan thus was fanning the flames of red-hot speculation when he flatly declared: "We have the evidence."
One skeptical view in Washington is that the CIA might have wanted much of the story to become public. The motive: by portraying Gaddafi as the madman behind a presidential assassination attempt, they could justify covert action aimed at toppling the Libyan leader. Even if that theory were true, however, it did not in itself undermine the credibility of the evidence.