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The Reagan Administration's greatest concern about the Sandinista regime is its avowed role in what its leaders call "a revolution without frontiers." Although the domino theory has been unfashionable since Viet Nam, it is increasingly apparent that the nations of Central America are vulnerable to a spreading Communist revolution. Even many liberals see this as a danger to the region. Morton Kondracke, the executive editor of the New Republic, last week compared the situation in Central America with what happened in Indochina in 1975 after Congress denied funds to South Viet Nam. He wrote in the Wall Street Journal: "We liberals cannot avert our eyes from what ensued: 3 million murders in Cambodia, total deprivation of human rights in Viet Nam and a falling of dominoes .. . Central America is more ethnically homogeneous than Indochina, so the dominoes there may fall faster."
Part of the Administration's difficulty in effectively countering the complex problems in Central America is that its policies have often been obscured by an excess of anti-Soviet rhetoric. This has provoked mistrust and opposition in the U.S., among West European allies and in Latin America. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig set the tone shortly after Reagan's Inauguration by vowing to "draw the line" against Soviet expansionism at El Salvador. Since then, Administration officials have periodically flogged the Red Menace, sometimes with unhappy results. The most notable diplomatic debacle occurred when the Administration promised to produce a Nicaraguan defector who would reveal evidence of outside control of the Salvadoran rebellion; the young soldier dutifully appeared before a group of American reporters and then denied the entire scenario.
Yet behind the Administration's often caustic rhetoric has been a relatively steady and moderate approach to Central America that is generally consistent with that taken by the Carter Administration. The State Department has worked to foster centrist democratic institutions in El Salvador and prodded the right-leaning government there into making some reforms. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders attempted to negotiate with Nicaragua an end to that regime's support for the Salvadoran rebels in return for U.S. aid and a pledge of nonintervention. His overtures were spurned by the Nicaraguans.
Even the covert activity being directed by the Reagan Administration against the Nicaraguan regime is an extension of policies initiated by Carter, who authorized the CIA to provide financial assistance to opponents of the new Sandinista regime in that country. During his first year in office, Reagan considered options like establishing an American-organized commando force to destabilize Nicaragua. Instead, he decided on a strategy of placing pressure on Nicaragua by organizing the contras into a political and military force with U.S. training and assistance.
The underlying goal of the Administration throughout has been to provide the necessary military support for El Salvador in order to protect it against subversion while it attempts to strengthen its economy and domestic political institutions. As Reagan said last week, "We do not view security assistance as an end in itself but as a shield for democratization, economic development and diplomacy."