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In the end, the Syrians were left to pick up the pieces. They accepted the Pakistani prisoners, put them up temporarily in the Damascus airport hotel and granted them "asylum." Syrian authorities seemed less certain what to call the disposition of the hijackers. A government spokesman said they were not being granted formal political asylum but rather, temporary refuge for "humanitarian" reasons. In light of Syria's past habit of letting hijackers disappear, neither prosecution of the threesome nor their return to Pakistan seemed likely.
Two of the gunmen had been wanted by Pakistani authorities even before the hijacking. The trio's 22-year-old leader, Salamullah Khan, a former science student at Karachi's Jinnah College, was accused of murder and other serious crimes. Nasir Jamal Khan, 22, also a former science student, was allegedly involved in the killing of another undergraduate. Only the third hijacker, Arshad Hussain, who was also a Karachi college student, had no previous police record.
All three claimed to belong to an underground group called Al Zulfikar, presumably named for ex-President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whom Zia deposed and had executed in 1979. An American passenger on the ill-fated flight, Frederick Hubbell, 29, said the hijackers were "deliberately erratic. Sometimes they were kind, sometimes they became very brutal—after all, they killed a man." Their victim: Pakistani Diplomat Tariq Rahim, shot in full view of the other passengers and dumped on the tarmac at Kabul.
Most of the 54 freed prisoners were dangerous criminals, according to Islamabad authorities. Nineteen were accused of murder or attempted murder. Revealingly, six had been charged with smuggling Soviet-made arms into Pakistan. Two had been convicted as Soviet spies and sentenced to 14 years. Eight others were charged with distributing antigovernment literature. The rest had been held on various charges of sabotage and subversion.
As more details emerged last week, the incident took on broader international dimensions. A central issue was the extent of Soviet and Afghan collaboration—or at least acquiescence—in the hijacking. Afghan authorities at Kabul airport had not only refused to let Pakistani negotiators talk to the hijackers, for instance, but had actively encouraged Islamabad to capitulate. Though their troops clearly controlled the airport, Soviet authorities turned down at least five U.S. requests that they help end the standoff. The Soviet claim: they had no responsibility for "the actions of the Afghan government." So flagrant had Moscow's obstructionism appeared that State Department Spokesman William Dyess concluded: "I don't see how the Soviets can entirely escape responsibility for what took place."
Moscow was quick to issue a sharp rejoinder. It denounced the State Department's remarks as "deliberate lies" intended to bolster U.S. "allegations of Soviet-backed international terrorism."