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A. The idea of a "presence" is not that you're going to try to build up an army big enough to stop the Soviet Union if it moves that way. That is not what is necessary. What is necessary is to indicate to them that by taking any reckless moves they would be facing a possible confrontation.
Q. You are referring to the so-called trip-wire effect?
A. Yes
Q. You have expressed a good deal of interest in improving relations with Central America. What specifically should the U.S. be doing to help restore stability in the latest trouble spot, El Salvador?
A. I think that with regard to all of our neighbors to the south, we have been somewhat insensitive to our size and our power. We have gone at them with plans and proposals and with good intentions, but it appears to them that this is something in the nature of an order. Here is a plan. Accept it. I think it is time for us to approach them only with the idea that I think we all share, and that is that there must be a more practical and better relationship than we have had because of [a common] interest in freedom. Maybe our first approach should be to find out their suggestions. How can we mutually benefit each other? I look forward to trying that. Concerning El Salvador, I think that there is one thing you have to say about the situation there: it is almost a kind of civil war. When that is happening, and if reforms are needed —and admittedly reforms are needed—you do not try to fight a civil war and institute reforms at the same time. Get rid of the war. Then go forward with the reforms.
Q. Some foreign governments consider you to be less concerned than the Carter Administration about their handling of protest movements. How strongly should the U.S. push nations like those in Central America on human rights?
A. Well, first of all, of course, I'm for human rights. And I think that is an American position, and I do not think we will ever retreat from it or ever should. But I think we have to balance better than we have. We should not carry our campaign for human rights to some small country we can pressure to the point where a government that, let's say, partially violates human rights in our eyes is succeeded by a government that denies all human rights. For example, Cuba. There was no question about Batista, and violations there of human rights in our eyes. But can we say the people in Cuba are today better off than they were before? In no way. There are no human rights under Castro. There are no human rights under the Soviet Union, as we see them. Now how can we justify making every concession in the world to have détente with the Soviet Union at the same time that we use the mailed fist, you might say, against some smaller country that in some instances, faced with dissent, violates human rights? What I believe is that we do our utmost to bring about [improvement in human rights] in those countries that are aligned with us, but not at the expense of helping an overthrow by a [faction] that is totalitarian. Take South Korea as an example. The South Korean government is doing things that we do not support. We wish they could be different. Do we take an action that opens South Korea up to possible conquest by North Korea where, again, there are no human rights?