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The Americans then, flew to Saudi Arabia for talks in Riyadh with Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal and Crown Prince Fahd. The Saudis (see following story) remained adamant against having U.S. forces on their soil. Nonetheless, the visit went off far better than a similar call by Brzezinski and Christopher last year, when they unsuccessfully sought Saudi support for the Camp David accords. TIME State Department Correspondent Gregory Wierzynski, who traveled with the two emissaries, reported that they made five general points: 1) the U.S. is committed to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully, with special efforts toward settling the question of Palestinian rights; 2) the U.S. is upgrading its military presence in the area, including its facilities in the Indian Ocean, and is prepared to engage in joint military exercises with friendly forces in the region; 3) the U.S. would Like, specifically, to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in the interests of mutual security; 4) the U.S. is pledged to defending Pakistan against Soviet invasion; and 5) the U.S. has an interest in an "independent and integral" Iran, once the hostage issue is settled. In response, said a delegation official, the Saudis showed a "heightened confidence in the U.S."
While Brzezinski and Christopher were trying to clarify U.S. policy abroad, there was increasing concern in Washington because the Carter Administration was once again sending out conflicting signals. There were still reverberations from Special Envoy Clark Clifford's visit to New Delhi, where he told a press conference that the U.S. would go to war if the Soviets "move toward the Persian Gulf." Secretary of State Cyrus Vance gently rebuked Clifford, apparently feeling that stating the policy too bluntly could only make Washington's dealings with Moscow more tense than they already are. Such slips may be minor considering the size of the turn that the Administration is making. More open to question, say critics, are some of the new policy's premises. Even with allowances for election-year hyperbole, the invasion of Afghanistan is not the most serious crisis since World War II, as Carter has claimed.
Some observers also believe that the Carter policy slides too lightly over the prospect of internal subversion, which is the most likely way the Soviets would try to extend their influence. The risks in the new policy are many, to be sure. Symbolic gestures—such as declaring the Persian Gulf an area of vital American interest—are fine, but only if backed by the real thing. So far the Administration has not defined precisely what it will do, except to state that it would go to war to defend the Gulf. The U.S. may be assuming responsibilities it cannot meet.
American efforts to coordinate an allied response to the Soviet intervention also received a setback late last week when France abruptly announced that it would not send a representative to a Foreign Ministers' meeting in Bonn next week. The talks had been initiated by the U.S. The French refusal to participate considerably undercut the impact of an unusually strong joint statement issued earlier in the week by French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt; it called the Soviet intervention "unacceptable" and demanded a withdrawal.